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This dissertation concerns cross-country consumption risk sharing in a long-run
perspective. Financial integration, empirically measured by cross-country hold-
ings of assets and liabilities, has increased dramatically in the past two decades.
But what can explain the lack of cross-country risk sharing documented in the
literature? Chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation address this question.
In Chapter 2, we set up a model to illustrate the mechanical dierence between
a bond economy and an insurance economy. We show that a bond economy can
intertemporally smooth consumption in face of transitory output shocks, but not
for permanent output shocks; an insurance economy is essential for risk sharing on
permanent shocks. We therefore show that when both transitory and permanent
output shocks exist, transitory shocks only create noise if the focus of interest is
on identifying risk sharing in the long run.
In Chapter 3, we specify an empirical nonstationary panel regression model to
test long-run consumption risk sharing across a sample of OECD and emerging
market countries. This is in contrast to tests in the literature which are mainly
about risks at business cycle frequency. We argue that these existing tests neglected
the permanent elements of risks that are of interest and that their model speci-
cations were not rich enough to accommodate heterogeneous short-run dynamics.
Since our methodology focuses on identifying cointegrating relationships while al-
lowing for arbitrary short-run dynamics, we can obtain a consistent estimate of
long-run risk sharing while disregarding any short-run nuisance factors.
Our results show that, for the period of 1950-2008, the level of long-run risk
sharing in OECD countries is similar to that in emerging market countries. How-
ever, during the nancial integration episode of the past two decades, long-run
risk sharing in OECD countries increased more than in emerging market countries.
Furthermore, we investigate the relationship between various measures of nancial
integration and cross-country risk sharing, but only nd weak evidence of such
linkages.
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Risk sharing or state contingent insurance is a vintage topic that can be traced
back to Arrow (1964), Debreu (1959) and recently Shiller (1993). Obstfeld and
Rogo (1995) showed that, assuming a framework of a complete market with two
countries, two periods, and a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility func-
tion, consumer utility maximization leads to a perfectly pooled equilibrium (Lu-
cas (1982)). This benchmark model implies that full risk sharing leads to perfect
cross-country consumption correlation. However, despite the long history and the-
oretical soundness, Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992) documented an important
consumption correlation regularity, i.e., cross-country consumption correlation
is no higher than cross-country output correlation, a contradiction to the model's
prediction. Following Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992), explanations of the reg-
ularity hinge on the idea of relaxing the consumption utility function to allow, for
example, non-addictive non-tradable goods (Backus and Smith, 1993; Tesar, 1993),
the inseparability of goods and leisure (Devereux, Gregory and Smith, 1992), and
taste shocks (Stockman and Tesar, 1995). The problem is that these models still
predict a strong consumption correlation, but empirical tests nevertheless indicate
otherwise.1
Parallel with the development in theoretical models, much of the empirical lit-
erature uses panel regression of idiosyncratic consumption growth on idiosyncratic
output growth for testing risk sharing (we call this type of regression conven-
tional panel regression). Since the benchmark model predicts consumption to be
perfectly correlated across countries, consumption should be orthogonal, or inde-
1Some models transmit strong consumption correlation into other aspects, which leads to irra-
tional testing results on those other aspects.
1
pendent, to output apart from the common components of world consumption and
output.
It is not surprising that the tests rejected the null hypothesis of orthogonality
from the benchmark model's prediction, considering that many factors can limit the
level of risk sharing in the real world (Mendoza, 1991; Backus, kehoe and Kydland,
1992 on market frictions and restrictions on market institutions; and Obstfeld and
Rogo, 1995 on moral hazard and sovereign risks). Since the null hypothesis is
always rejected, people take a more practical approach to interpret the estimated
slope coecient as a measure of risk sharing. However, this leads to indecisive
ndings on risk sharing. For example, Canova and Ravn (1996) concluded that
risk sharing is almost complete in a short cycle, but not in medium and long cycles.
This contradicts the claim of Artis and Homann (2006) that there is more risk
sharing in the long run rather than in the short run.
Furthermore, we expect an increase in risk sharing following the recent increase
in global nancial integration since a country is better o when nancial integration
can trade away some of its idiosyncratic risk through international diversication.
What is puzzling is that much of the literature did not nd increases in risk sharing
(Bai and Zhang, 2006; Moser, Pointer and Scharler, 2004).2
These empirical ndings imply that we need to be cautious on interpreting test
results. In order to explain this, we illustrate in Chapter 2 the mechanical dierence
between intertemporal smoothing and risk sharing and show how the estimate of
risk sharing can be biased due to contamination by intertemporal smoothing and
other factors.
2Artis and Homann (2006) and Artis and Homann (2007), among a few papers, found risk
sharing increased in the recent nancial integration period. Labhard and Sawichi (2006),
based on a factor analysis approach, even found a slight decrease in risk sharing between UK
regions and between UK and other OECD countries. For survey papers, please refer to Kose,
Prasad and Terrones (2007) and Corcoran (2008).
2
Specically, we set up a model to show that a bond market can intertemporally
smooth consumption in face of transitory output shocks, but not for output shocks
that have permanent eects. An insurance market is essential for risk sharing on
permanent shocks. The types of shocks do not matter in the case of complete
insurance because all the risks caused by shocks are fully shared across state of
natures and there is no intertemporal smoothing. However, if an insurance market
is not complete, the consumption dynamics, driven by the motivation of intertem-
poral smoothing, is subject to these types of shocks. For example, intertemporal
smoothing through a bond market should drive consumption moves more dramati-
cally than output if output is a unit root process, but relatively smooth if output is
stationary. Taking this into a panel with heterogeneous cross-country output pro-
cesses, the estimated slope coecient in a conventional panel regression captures
risk sharing eects, an unknown term, plus a bias caused by correlation between
output and the error term. However, if the focus of interest is on identifying risk
sharing in the long run, we show that transitory shocks only create noise in
identifying long-run risk sharing through a nonstationary panel regression. More
generally, other nuisance factors, such as taste shocks or short-run dynamics caused
by market frictions, also become innocuous.
Chapter 3 tackles the issue noted above by estimating an empirical nonstationary
panel regression model. Let us discuss the limitations of the conventional panel re-
gression. First, conventional panel tests do not consider the permanent elements of
risks that are of interest. This is because these tests work with dierenced data in
order to achieve stationarity of the data and therefore avoid the spurious regression
problem. However, by doing so, they disregard the permanent element of risks im-
mediately. If the welfare gain of sharing the risks stemming from permanent shocks
is larger than that of sharing transitory risks, it is especially important to analyze
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the sharing of permanent risks. Secondly, as a result of using specications that are
not rich enough to accommodate the true data generating process (DGP), conven-
tional panel tests omit important factors such as heterogeneous short-run dynamics
in output and consumption processes. In many applications, a conventional panel
regression is suitable because the panel contains data with a large N dimension
and a limited T dimension. The limited/nite T dimension constrains a conven-
tional panel's ability to deal with dynamics, especially heterogeneous dynamics,
even if theories indicate the importance of dealing with dynamics. However, in our
application, it is important to take the heterogeneous dynamics into consideration
simply because we work with countries which are dierent in so many dimensions.
In light of these limitations, we estimate an empirical nonstationary panel regres-
sion model that tests long-run consumption risk sharing. Our methodology focuses
on identifying a long-run cointegrating relationship between consumption and out-
put that is induced by risk sharing while allowing for arbitrary short-run dynamics.
This implies that we can obtain a consistent estimate of long-run risk-sharing while
disregarding any short-run nuisance factors.
This is because a nonstationary panel regression essentially uses time-series prop-
erties which take care of dynamics that are unknown. We therefore can be blind
about many aspects of the DGP. Specically, we allow exibility in both the length
and the magnitude of dynamics across countries. This allows us to circumvent
many issues that require strong assumptions in the conventional panel. Some may
argue that it is nice to apply time-series arguments to macroeconomic tests, but
we face data limitations. One of the nice features of nonstationary panels is that
it uses data in cross-sectional dimensions to compensate for relatively short data
in temporal dimensions in order to achieve reliable estimating and testing results.
We also address an important issue in the empirical work on risk sharing: the
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cross country variation in the steady state of risk sharing. On a practical level,
dierent countries will reasonably choose the level of cross-country holdings of
assets and liabilities to the extent that costs equal benets. Given that costs and
benets may dier across countries and across dierent contingencies, the level of
risk sharing should be dierent. While the nonstationary panel specication allows
heterogeneous slope coecients, the slope coecient is forced to be common across
countries in a conventional panel specication. As a byproduct of allowing the
heterogeneity in risk sharing, we can study cross-country risk sharing distribution
and link this distribution pattern to static nancial integration indicators.
The empirical results of Chapter 3 show that, for the period of 1950-2008, the
level of long-run risk sharing in OECD countries is similar to that in emerging
market countries. However, during the nancial integration episode of the past two
decades, long-run risk sharing in OECD countries increased more than emerging
market countries. Furthermore, we investigate the relationship between various
measures of nancial integration and cross-country risk sharing, but only nd weak
evidences on such linkages.
In sum, this dissertation contributes to the literature on illustrating long-run
cross-country consumption risk sharing and to the literature on empirical tests of it.
The structure of the rest of this dissertation is as follows. Chapters 2 and 3 are both
self-contained essays. Chapter 2 provides a theoretical illustration on cross-country
consumption risk sharing. Chapter 3 tests long-run consumption risk sharing across
a sample of OECD and emerging market countries. Chapter 4 summarizes the main
ndings in both essays and discusses future research directions.
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Illustrations on
Cross-country Consumption Risk Sharing
2.1 Introduction
We assume a world of N small endowment economies with innite periods. Each
economy is endowed with the same single tradable good in each period. Endow-
ments are stochastic, with both stochastic permanent shocks and transitory shocks
possible.
The main purpose of this chapter is to show how endowment risks/shocks can
be traded under dierent market structures. To that end, and to keep our model
as simple as possible, we assume endowment is perishable. For perishable goods,
the only way to save them is through nancial markets.
We assume three market structures: autarky market/economy, risk-free bond
market (or bond economy) and Arrow-Debreu state-contingent securities market
(or insurance economy). In an autarky economy, people should consume their
current endowment if the value of their current endowment perishes to zero in
the next period, so risk sharing is trivially zero. For this reason, in the following
sections, we focus on just two scenarios: the bond economy and the insurance
economy.
In section 2.2, we set up our bond and insurance economy models and solve the
optimal consumption paths respectively. We explain that the insurance economy,
compared to the bond economy, can achieve better consumption risk sharing since
people make sucient ex-ante asset trading to protect against future contingencies
aecting their economic well-being. In section 2.3, we give a model for partial risk




Since each country in the world is small, we assume the world interest rate, r. We
also assume that people have the same time preference. In a setting with stochas-
tic endowment, people cannot perfectly foresee random outputs, so consumption
decisions have to be based on expectations on future outputs. We therefore assume
rational expectation on realizations of random outputs in the future.
2.2.1 Bond Economy
We rst discuss the question of utility maximization in the bond economy.
Expected utility:
Under the setting of one good and an innite time horizon, people maximize the





where Cs is consumption at period s; u(·) is a period utility function; β is
the subjective discounting factor on time preference; and Et [·] is the conditional
expectation operator at period t. Ut is therefore an expected value. To be specic,
it is the present expected values of discounted future consumption utilities.
Since expectations need not be correct, people can be surprised by shocks. In a
bond economy, people's consumption is therefore contingent on shocks.
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Budget constraint:
Since a bond is the only internationally traded asset in this economy, the intertem-















where Yt is output endowment at period s; and Bt is the bond holding at the
beginning of period t. We restrict Yt from growing faster than at rate r, i.e.,
E|Yt| < c(1+r)t ∀ t, where c is a constant. Under this restriction, equation (2) holds







Bs = 0 (3)
Recall that we assume output is perishable, so people can only save or borrow
to smooth consumption by changing their bond holdings.
2.2.2 Insurance Economy
In a bond economy, we limit our discussion of maximizing consumption utility
through trading a risk-free bond. However, in today's international nancial mar-
kets, there are an increasingly wide range of nancial instruments besides a risk-free
bond. An example is stock. A dierent feature of stock, compared to a risk-free
bond, is that its returns are state-contingent, which means returns vary accord-
ing to realized states of nature. Will trading state-contingent assets change an
economy's reaction to shocks and therefore better mitigate the eects of shocks?
3For more details, please refer to Obstfeld and Rogo (1995).
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To answer the question above, we assume a complete market for insuring output
risks, as developed by Arrow (1964) and Debreu (1959). For simplicity, we assume
in this section Yt only has a nite number of possible realizations.
We now introduce the complete Arrow-Debreu market, along with some new
notations. We start with a simpler setting of a world of two endowment economies,
A and B, that exist for two periods 1 and 2. We assume two outcomes (states of
nature), o1 and o2, possible in period 2, which dier only in their associated outputs
of A and B. Formally, for the world economy, we have Ω = {o1, o2}, the sample
space of period 2. The complete information σ − algebra eld contains 22 = 4
events, namely e1 = {o1}: outcome 1 happens, e2 = {o2}: outcome 2 happens,
e3 = {}: neither 1 nor 2 happens, and e4 = {o1, o2}: either 1 or 2 happens.
Suppose that people can buy or sell securities with the following payo structure
in period 1: the owner (seller) of the security receives (pays) 1 unit of output in
period 2 if oi occurs on period 2, but receives (pays) nothing if oj occurs, where
i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j. We use p(oi) to denote the period 1 price of such a security,
quoted in terms of a sure period 2 output; We denote by π(oi) the associated
probability for oi. Please note that p(e3) = 0 and π(e3) = 0; p(e4) = p(o1) + p(o2)
and π(e4) = π(o1) + π(o2) = 1.
We can generalize this formation into a world of N economies that exists in-
nitely, with nite Ns outcomes {o1, o2, . . . ons , . . . , oNs} possible in period s. The
output level of period s now not only depends on outcomes in period s, but also on
the history of the economy up to period s. We use ht to denote the history of the
world economy in period t. In this multiperiod setting, ht is a state of nature that
represents current and past outcomes. Thus ht is a vector valued element in the
sample space of period t, denoted as ht ∈ Ht(ht). If outcome ont+1 occurs on period
t + 1, then ht+1 = (ont+1 , ht) is an element in the sample space of period t + 1,
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denoted as ht+1 ∈ Ht+1(ht). There are Nt+1 possible outcomes and so Nt+1 possible
states of nature in period t + 1 (from the point of view of period t, given ht has
happened). Progressively, for period t+ 2, ht+2 = (ont+2 , ont+1 , ht) = (ont+2 , ht+1),
there are Nt+1 ×Nt+2 states of nature in period t+ 2 sample space Ht+2(ht); and
for any period s > t + 2, hs = (ons , hs−1) there are Nt+1 ×Nt+2 × · · · ×Ns states
of nature in period s sample space Hs(ht). We can think of a sample space Hs(ht)
as all possible history of the world economy from period t through period s that
has Nt+1 × Nt+2 × · · · × Ns elements. The corresponding complete information
σ − algebra eld contains 2Nt+1×Nt+2×···×Ns events.
Suppose that people can buy or sell securities with the following payo structure
in period t: the owner (seller) of the security receives (pays) 1 unit of output in





s ∈ Hs(ht) and h
′
s 6= hs. We use p(hs|ht) to denote the period t price of such a
security, quoted in terms of a sure period s output. We denote by π(hs|ht) the
associated probability for hs to occur. We call such a security the Arrow-Debreu
security for hs. We call a market an Arrow-Debreu market if it constitutes such
securities for every hs ∈ Hs(ht), and we call an economy with Arrow-Debreu market
a (complete) insurance economy. Please note, after dening the security price and
probability for each state of nature, we can yield the composite security price
and probability for all events. For example, for an event {hs, h
′
s}, the associated
probability equals π(hs|ht) + π(h
′
s|ht) and the price of the composite security
equals p(hs|ht) + p(h
′
s|ht).
An insurance economy has stronger assumptions than the case of a bond econ-
omy. We now assume people have complete information on prices of all Arrow-
Debreu securities instead of just one price, r, the interest rate of a risk-free bond.
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Expected utility:
In an insurance economy, people maximize expected utility as follows:








where C(hs) is the uncertain consumption of future period s. Please note that
u[C(hs)], s ≥ t+1, does not depend on the realized state of nature ht, i.e., u[C(hs)]
is stable across states of nature. This equation is no dierent from equation (1).
However, it shows explicitly how the expectation in equation (1) is computed be-
cause this helps to illustrate that ex-ante contingency consumption arrangements
in an insurance economy can achieve stable consumption across states of nature.4
Budget constraint:





















p(hs | ht)Y (hs)
 (5)
where Y (hs) is the uncertain output of future period s. The LHS of equation (5)
gives the present value of the country's uncertain consumption stream; the RHS
gives the present value of the country's uncertain output.
4Arrow Debreu securities do not exist in the real world, but the same results of the insurance
economy model can be achieved in a mutual fund economy model. For details on this, please
refer to Obstfeld and Rogo (1995).
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2.2.3 Two Types of Shocks
Unit root process
In this paper, we assume output Yt is I(1) in the sense that
5:
Yt − Yt−1 = ut (6)
where the process {ut} satises
A(L)ut = B(L)εt
with
A(L) = 1− a1L− a2L2 − · · · − apLp
B(L) = 1 + b1L+ b2L
2 + · · ·+ bLq
where {εt} is a sequence of i.i.d. random variables with Eεt = 0, Eε2t = σ2ε , and
Eε4t <∞.
By denition, the process {ut} is an ARMA(p, q) process if {ut} is stationary.
If we further assume A(z) and B(z) have no common roots, and A(z) 6= 0 and
B(z) 6= 0 for all |z| ≤ 1, i.e., all the roots of A(z) and B(z) lie outside the unit
5Generally, an output process can be modeled as a unit root with drift. We assume no drift.
This is because, in terms of risk sharing, we are sharing risks corresponding to stochastic
components of output, or in other words, corresponding to the forecasting variance from a
certain time point of view. The drift term is independent of the forecasting error and therefore
can be safely dropped. Technically, if Yt − Yt−1 = δ + ut is the true DGP, we can always
subtract δt from Yt to make the mean of Yt constant. However, the variance of Yt is still
time dependent and goes to innity over time. Note that the statement of innite variance is
loose. Strictly speaking, if the dierence of an I(1) process is a causal and invertible ARMA
process, as we dene immediately below, the variance goes to innity.
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circle, then {ut} is causal and invertible and can be expressed as6









1 + b1L+ b2L
2 + · · ·+ bqLq
1− a1L− a2L2 − · · · − apLp
= ψ0 + ψ1L+ ψ2L
2 + ψ3L








j · |ψj| <∞ (8)
Permanent and transitory shocks
According to Proposition 17.2 of Hamilton (1994), process (6) can be rewritten as





j=0ajεt−j, aj = −(ψj+1 + ψj+2 + ψj+3 + · · · ), and∑∞
j=0|aj| <∞.
This says that for any nonstationary process that satises equations (6)-(8), it
can be decomposed into a random walk process, ψ(1) · (ε1 + ε2 + · · · + εt), the
initial condition, Y0 − η0, and a weakly dependent stationary process, ηt. This
6For more discussion on causal and invertible ARMA process, please refer to Brockwell and
Davis (1991) and Prucha (2004).
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decomposition was rst observed by Beveridge and Nelson (1981) and therefore
called the Beveridge and Nelson decomposition.
Since ηt is a stationary process, only the rst term, ψ(1) · (ε1 + ε2 + · · · + εt),
matters in the long run. This is because when t→∞ the other terms converge to
zero asymptotically at the rate of 1/
√
T .
In order to facilitate the illustration of the dierence of intertemporal smoothing
on permanent shocks and transitory shocks, we rewrite equation (6) into the form
driven by two additive shocks:
Yt = Pt + Tt (10)
where





where {θt} is a sequence of i.i.d. random variables with Eθt = 0, Eθ2t = σ2θ , and
Eθ4t < ∞7; {ζt} is similarly dened. {θt} and {ζt} are uncorrelated for all leads
and lags.8 Note that, given the assumption that ut is causal and invertible, Tt is
also a causal and invertible ARMA process.
Process {Tt} is weakly dependent since the covariance of Tt and Tt+h tends to
zero as h tends to innity.9 This is a very dierent property from the process {Pt}
7Process {Pt}, such dened, is a random walk process. It is a special case of a unit root process.
The feature of a random walk process emphasized repeatedly in this paper is its persistence,
or in other words, its non-weakly-dependence. We say a random walk is highly persistent
since (as you will see in the text shortly) Et(Pt+s) = Pt for all s > t.
8For a formal proof that process (6) can indeed be rewritten into process (10) - (12), please refer
to Chapter 13 of Hamilton (1994).
9We know cov(Tt, Tt+h) 6= 0 even as h→∞ if the AR part exists. However, because the speed
with which cov(Tt, Tt+h) tends to zero occurs at a geometric rate, we consider the process
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that is highly persistent, since E(Pt+h|Pt) = Pt for all h ≥ 1, i.e., the predicated
value of Pt+h, conditional on information available at period t, always equals the
value of period t regardless of how large h is.
So far, we assume the transitory component follows a weakly stationary process
(12). It is a general process where bj has a complicated coecient structure on
an innite-order moving average process. The reason to start with such a general
specication is because we assume that cross-country output processes are hetero-
geneous in the sense that {Tt} is dierent across countries. However, when model
illustrations are in the context of one certain small open economy, we assume a





where 0 ≤ ρ < 1. {Tt} in equation (13) is a stationary AR(1) process, expressed








Using the Lagrange Multiplier to maximize utility equation (1) under budget con-
straint equation (3), or equivalently, plug into equation (1) the current account
{Tt} to be short memory.
10We use the simple AR (1) process below to show that intertemporal smoothing cannot share
permanent risks and only share transitory risks through borrowing and lending. This conclu-
sion should apply to the general class of an ARMA(p, q) process.
11A little algebra shows that the AR (1) representation is Tt = ρTt−1 + ζt.
12Please refer to Appendix A for an illustration on the dierences of permanent and transitory
shocks in terms of forecast.
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identity equation (14),
CAt = Bt+1 −Bt = Yt + rBt − Ct (14)











If we assume (1 + r)β = 1 and a linear quadratic utility function, u(Ct) =
Ct − θ02 (Ct)
2, equation (15) leads to Hall's (1978) result:
EtCt+s = Ct (16)
for all s > t.

























Et(Ys), equation (17) can be rewritten into Ct =
rBt + Ŷt. This says that consumption is the sum of the return on bond holding,
rBt, and the permanent income, Ŷt, where Ŷt is the weighted average of life-time
income.
From equation (17), we can yield consumption changes,
16
Ct+1 − Ct = r(Bt+1 −Bt) + (Ŷt+1 − Ŷt)
= r(Yt − Ŷt) + (Ŷt+1 − Ŷt) (18)
where the last equality holds by substituting Bt+1−Bt with the result of plugging
Ct = rBt + Ŷt into equation (14). Equation (18) says change in consumption is
the sum of change in the return on the current account and change in expected
permanent income when new information comes.
Rearranging equation (18), we yield










Change in consumption is now expressed as the weighted average of changes
in expectations on output. So, in a bond economy, change in consumption is a
function of unexpected shocks.
Now let's look at the dierence of consumption intertemporal smoothing under
dierent output processes.
 First, let's check the case when output is stationary, i.e., the case when
Yt = Pt + Tt and θt = 0. In this case, Yt = Tt, an AR(1) process as dened
by equation (13).13
For an AR(1) process, we know Et(Ys) = ρ
s−tYt; and we know changes in pre-
dictions due to shock, ζt: Et(Yt) − Et−1(Yt) = ζt, Et(Yt+1) − Et−1(Yt+1) = ρζt,
Et(Yt+2)−Et−1(Yt+2) = ρ2ζt, and limj→∞Et(Yt+j)−Et−1(Yt+j) = limj→∞ρjζt =
0.
13We assume AR(1) process with no constant term for simplicity. The results below should hold
for the case with constant term by replacing Yt into Yt − c, where c is the constant term.
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Plugging Et(Ys) = ρ
s−tYt into equation (17) yields
Ct = rBt +
r
1 + r − ρ
Yt (20)
Plugging changes in predictions into equation (19) yields
Ct − Ct−1 =
r
1 + r − ρ
ζt (21)
Equation (21) gives one of the key results of the bond economy. The marginal




1+r−ρζt), is not too dierent from
marginal utility in period t − 1, u′(Ct−1). In other words, marginal utility is not
much aected when shock is transitory since the change in consumption is only
r
1+r−ρζt, a small fraction of ζt. Comparing equation (21) to equation (16), we see
that ex-post consumption is close to the ex-ante consumption plan. This implies
that the potential benet of risk sharing through insurance is small from period
t-1 to period t given intertemporal smoothing exists.14
To further investigate the implication of equation (21), let's consider a shock in
period t and set all shocks to zero in periods s > t. We assume B0 is the bond
holding at the beginning of t − 1 and, for simplicity, zero output before period
t − 1. From equation (20), we have the evolution of consumption, output, and
bond holding summarized in the table below:
s Ys Cs Bs
t-1 0 rB0 B0
t ζt rB0 +
r
1+r−ρζt B0





14Baxter and Crucini (1995) has concluded that intertemporal smoothing can act as a close
substitute for risk sharing if output shocks are transitory.
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· · · · · · · · · · · ·
The table shows that consumption in period t−1 equals interest income on bond
holding. On the impact of a positive (negative) output shock, people consume
permanent income and run a current account surplus (decit) through lending
(borrowing) a portion of current output (Friedman (1957)). Over time, the current
account surplus (decit) decreases as output decreases (increases) and consumption
is maintained at its permanent income level.
Let's dene short-run changes of consumption and output under the impact of
shock ζt as C
SR
t ≡ ∂Ct∂ζt ζt and Y
SR
t ≡ ∂Yt∂ζt ζt, respectively, where the superscript SR











t = ζt (from the table above).
Notice that Y SRt jumps by the level of shock ζt while C
SR
t changes much less
dramatically, a conrmation on the implication of equation (21). We call equation
(22) a short-run relationship between consumption and output in the bond econ-
omy; and the coecient in equation (22) a measure of the short-run intertemporal
smoothing eect.




Y LRt ≡ lims→∞
∂Yt+s
∂ζt




t in this case is not




t = lims→∞ ρ
sζt = 0.
 Secondly, let's look at the case when output dynamics follows process (11),
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i.e., Yt = Pt + Tt and ζt = 0. Now Yt = Pt, a random walk process dened
by equation (11).
In this case, Et(Yt+s) = Yt. Substitute it into equation (17), we get
Ct = rBt + Yt (23)
Equation (23) says people consume all interest earnings and all current output.
There is no changes in bond holding.
Notice that consumption and output move one-to-one, indicating no intertem-
poral smoothing at all. This is another key result of the bond economy, but it is
very dierent compared to the case of transitory shocks. The marginal utility now
jumps up/down driven by the level of shock θt since ex-post marginal utility in
period t is u
′
(Ct−1 + θt), dierent from marginal utility of period t-1, u
′
(Ct−1), by
the magnitude of the shock θt. This implies that although people prefer constant
consumption and plan for it ex-ante (equation (16)), it turns out that constant
consumption is not achievable ex-post. Intuitively, this is where the benet of risk
sharing through insurance comes.
For a random walk shock θt in period t and no further shocks in periods s > t,
the evolution of consumption, output , and bond holding are as follows:
s Ps Cs Bs
t-1 0 rB0 B0
t θt rB0 + θt B0
t+1 θt rB0 + θt B0
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
The dynamics in this table conrm that the current account is zero in every
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period, meaning a country cannot borrow/lend against a permanent shock without
violating its budget constraints. It therefore conrms that the shock's eect cannot
be shared through intertemporal smoothing.
In terms of CSRt and Y
SR




since CSRt = θt and Y
SR
t = θt.




since CLRt = θt and Y
LR
t = θt. This indicates no intertemporal smoothing in the
long run as well.
 In the real world, output is subject to both permanent and transitory shocks.
In this case, Yt = Pt + Tt, θt 6= 0 and ζt 6= 0.
We can rewrite process Yt into the following ARI(1, 1) representation,
Yt+1 − Yt = %(Yt − Yt−1) + εt+1 (26)
Backward recursiveness results in




where % and εt, corresponding to parameter ρ and innovations θt and ζt, are each
some complicated function of ρ, σθ, and σζ .
15
15I did not work out the exact form of % and εt since it does not provide any extra insight for
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From equation (27), we have the following results: Et(Yt) − Et−1(Yt) = εt,
Et(Yt+1)−Et−1(Yt+1) = (1+%)εt, Et(Yt+2)−Et−1(Yt+2) = (1+%+%2)εt, Et(Yt+3)−
Et−1(Yt+3) = (1−%s−t)/(1−%)εt, and limj→∞Et(Yt+j)−Et−1(Yt+j) = 1/(1−%)εt.16
Substituting these expressions into equation (17) and equation (19), we can get,17
Ct = rBt + Yt +
%
(1 + r − %)
(Yt − Yt−1) (28)
Ct − Ct−1 =
1 + r
1 + r − %
εt (29)
Note that consumption function (28) now has an error correction term in it. The
evolution of output, consumption, and bond holding can be summarized as:
s Ys Cs Bs
t-1 0 rB0 B0
t εt rB0 +
1+r
1+r−%εt B0










· · · · · · · · · · · ·
t+s (1 + %+ · · ·+ %s)εt rB0 + 1+r1+r−%εt B0 −
%(1+%+···%s−1)
1+r−% εt
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
∞ 1/(1− %)εt rB0 + 1+r1+r−%εt B0 −
%
(1−%)(1+r−%)εt
The dened short-run relationship is
the purpose of this paper. If you are interested in more details, please refer to Chapter 4 of
Hamilton (1994).
16Please note that if we let j = t + 1 − s, we can rewrite equation (27) into Yt+1 = Yt +∑∞
j=0 %
jεt+1−j . We can see it is a special case of equation (6).










t = εt. Notice that in period t, consumption
moves more dramatically than GDP since consumption moves to its permanent
level immediately while output movement is a gradual process.18
In the long run,
CLRt =
1 + r − %− r%












t are similar when r is







1+r−% . So there is a small blip, r%, between consumption and output due to
intertemporal smoothing on transitory shocks. However, given r is small and 0 <
% < 1, consumption and output move closely, indicating intertemporal smoothing
is small and empirically negligible in the long run.20
To conclude this case: intertemporal smoothing in a nonstationary output pro-
cess is only important in terms of short-run eects. Since the bond market can
not share risks induced by permanent shocks, consumption follows output closely
in the long run.
18This is essentially the Deaton paradox in empirical literature.
19When % equals 1, the output process is an I(2) process, a case we do not consider in this paper.
20When % = 0, output degenerates into a pure random walk process and, therefore, consumption
and GDP comove perfectly.
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Insurance economy
With output uncertainty in a bond economy, individuals keep expected marginal
utility stable over time through borrowing and lending (since a risk-free bond is
the only nancial instrument) after learning of shocks.
Of course, people would prefer stable consumption across states as well. How-
ever, this cannot be achieved in the absence of an insurance market. The essence of
state contingent claims (Arrow-Debreu securities) is that it can transfer purchase
power over time as well as across states. To see this, we would like to focus our
concern on the optimal conditions of an insurance economy.





)s−tp(hs | ht)u′(Ct)=π(hs | ht)βs− tu′[C(hs)] (32)
We continue to assume (1+ r)β = 1. Furthermore, we assume actuarial fairness,









s | ht) is a counterpart of (1 + r)β = 1. In a bond economy,
if (1 + r)β 6= 1, this will induce a consumption tilting over time. Similarly, if




s | ht), this will induce a consumption tilting
across states of nature. Since the purpose of this chapter is to discuss the dierent
mechanisms of risk sharing in a bond economy and an insurance economy, these
assumptions help focus on the key point and avoid distractions.21






21The assumption of actuarial fairness implies that we assume lenders are risk neutral, i.e., the




s ∈ Hs(ht) is a dierent history of world economy through date s (dierent
from hs). This is the Euler equation of the insurance economy, indicating equalized
marginal utilities across states and over time.









u′(Ct), where the last equality holds because
∑
hs∈Hs(ht) π(hs|ht) = 1. This says
that consumption smoothing achieved in the bond economy can also be achieved
in the insurance economy.
Under a quadratic utility function, equation (33) implies
C̄ = Ct = C(hs) = C(h
′
s) (34)
The equalities remind us of equation (16) in the bond economy, but now it has
stronger implications: today's consumption not only equals expected future con-
sumption, but also equals future consumption no matter what happens between
today and the future. Consumption now is actually constant across states and
dates.












p(hs | ht)Y (hs)

This equation looks similar to equation (17) in the bond economy, but the impli-
cation is again dierent. The former equation holds both before and after shocks
25
happen since risks have been insured ex-ante. Equation (17), however, shows that
changes in consumption is a function of unexpected shocks, which implies that con-
sumption varies one-for-one with output realization. In other words, consumption
is not insured ex-ante.
We can see that in the case of insurance, consumption is independent from its
own realized output. This implies that no matter what the eects of idiosyncratic
shocks are, permanent or transitory, the induced risks are fully shared.22
An example on bond and insurance economies
We use the following example in order to see the sharp dierences between the
bond economy and the insurance economy.
Assume a world consists of N rudimentary endowment economies. In order to
keep our example simple, we assume all economies are identical in every aspect until
period t. In period t, each economy is subject to i.i.d. mean zero idiosyncratic
endowment shocks, and there are no further shocks in periods s > t.
We assume there are no aggregate shocks, meaning world output is constant over
time, Y Wt =
N∑
i=1
Yit = N × Ȳ , where Y Wt is the total world output in period t; and
Ȳ is the pre-shock output level of an economy.
Let's review what happens in a bond economy. In the rst case, suppose shocks
are purely temporary, meaning the shocks' eects are so transitory that it does
not aect outputs in period t + 1. We therefore can write the output process of
country i as Yit = Ȳ + εit where Et−1εit = 0 for all i.
Suppose that country i's output shock is positive, say, in period t, Yit = Ȳ + $2.
22In a general equilibrium framework with market clearing conditions, Debreu showed that con-
sumption is a constant portion of world output. Together with the derived result here that
consumption is constant, the result implies there is no growth in world output, meaning
that there is no aggregate output shocks. This is why in empirical studies, world output is
subtracted from individual country's consumption.
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Since there is no aggregate shock, the total output in the rest of the world in period
t is (N − 1)Ȳ − $2. All countries' outputs return to Ȳ in periods s > t. According
to the analysis in Section 2.2.4, country i smooths its consumption by consuming
Cit = Ȳ +r/(1+r)×$2 and lending to rest of the world (running a current account
surplus) of 1/(1 + r) × $2. In period s > t, there are no further shocks, and i's
consumption will remain higher since it receives returns from its period t lending.
In the second case, let's assume output shocks are permanent, i.e., Yit = Y.Ni,t−1+





Yit = N × Ȳ holds since there is no aggregate shock.
In this case, i's consumption increases by $2 permanently, and consumption in the
rest of the world decreases by $2 permanently (the current account will therefore
be zero).
The results in this example conrm our conclusion in section 2.2.4: intertemporal
smoothing in a bond market can achieve consumption smoothing against transitory
shocks, but not against permanent shocks.
In an insurance economy, however, people can trade Arrow-Debreu securities
for all possible state of natures, i.e., every realization of the random shock has
been hedged ex-ante. In this example, by the time of period t, all the countries
have already insured each other against any country idiosyncratic output shocks. If
country i's output is Yit = Ȳ +$2 and output of the rest of the world is (N−1)Ȳ−$2,
country i's consumption equals Cit = Ȳ ; if country i's output is Yi,t−1 + $2 and
output of the rest of the world is (N−1)Yi,t−1−$2, country i's consumption equals
Cit = Yi,t−1 = Ȳ . With insurance, consumption is independent of the $2 shocks,
regardless of whether the shock is permanent or transitory.
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2.3 Intermediate Case
The illustration in section 2.2 considers consumption risk sharing in a bond econ-
omy and an insurance economy separately. Such models are clearly extreme. In
the real world, it is well known that the nancial market is incomplete, i.e., we are
facing an intermediate case where insurance is between 0 and 100 percent.
We now model consumption risk sharing under general output process (6) in an
incomplete market with partial insurance. We assume that the 1 − λ portion of
the risks is insurable. So, equation (6) can be rewritten as
Yt − Yt−1 = (1− λ)ut + λut
We dene (1 − λ)ut = uIt and λut = uUt , where the superscripts I and U index
the insurable and uninsurable respectively. Similarly, we dene (1−λ)Yt = Y It and
λYt = Y
U










Y It − Y It−1 = uIt
Y Ut − Y Ut−1 = uUt
where each process has similar statistical properties as process (6).
This conceptional partition is in line with some of the recent work on exploring
the implications of incomplete markets where there do not exist sucient contracts
that would allow people to fully allocate their consumption and resources across
states and over time. The incompleteness can be thought of as both exogenous
and endogenous. When it is endogenous, it may come from the inability to write
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contracts against certain risks or to enforce contracts even if contracts are writable.
When it is exogenous, it could be that some people are prevented from insurance
markets or some goods are non-tradable in nature.23
This section will follow in two parts. In the rst part, we will show how risk
sharing can be identied in the long run in a nonstationary regression framework
for an individual country. In order to facilitate this purpose, we again take the
special process (26) of the general output process (6). In the second part, we will
show long-run risk sharing can be consistently identied even in a nonstationary
panel of countries with heterogeneous output processes; that is, the output process
in dierent countries takes a certain form from the general output process (6).
2.3.1 Identifying Risk Sharing in Long Run
Short-run and long-run relationships
For insurable risks, results from the insurance economy should apply, i.e., con-
sumption is constant and therefore independent of output; likewise, for uninsurable
risks, results from the bond economy apply. For example, when the output pro-







= (1− λ)C̄ + (rBt + Y Ut +
%
1 + r − %
4Y Ut )
= (1− λ)C̄ + rBt + λ(Yt +
%
(1 + r − %)
∆Yt)
23Although the cause of market incompleteness can be endogenous, we do not tackle the issue of
endogenous λ in estimation. Rather, we take a practical stance by interpreting λ as a measure
of de facto level of risk sharing.
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where CIt and C
U




t ; Bt = Y
U
t−1 + (1 +
r)Bt−1 − CUt−1 which only involves Y Ut and CUt since bond holding in an insurance
market is zero; and 4Y Ut = Y Ut − Y Ut−1 and 4Yt = Yt − Yt−1.
Likewise, we can also solve consumption in special cases where output processes
follow an AR(1) (equation (13)) and a random walk (equation (11)). We summarize
results in the table below:
Yt Ct Ct − Ct−1
Case1 Yt = ρYt−1 + ζt (1− λ)C̄ + rBt + λr1+r−ρYt
λr
1+r−ρζt
Case2 Yt = Yt−1 + θt (1− λ)C̄ + rBt + λYt λθt
Case3 4Yt = %4Yt−1 + εt (1− λ)C̄ + rBt + λ(Yt + %(1+r−%)∆Yt)
λ(1+r)
1+r−%εt
where Ct − Ct−1 equals the results from the bond economy multiplied by λ
because CIt = (1− λ)C̄ is constant.
Recalling CSRt and C
LR
t dened in bond economy, we can write the counterparts






t . These two relation-
ships hold again because CI = (1 − λ)C̄ is constant. The dened short-run and
long-run outputs stay the same. The table below summarizes the short-run and
long-run risk sharing relationships:
Yt Short run Long run






t · · ·




















The short-run relationships depend on serial correlation parameters of the output
process, besides λ. This is because the eect of intertemporal smoothing in the
bond market is important in the short run.
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The long-run relationships, however, when they are well-dened, only depend on
λ, besides a small blip (in Case3).
Estimating long-run relationships
We rst derive the testing equation on long-run risk sharing and show the derived
testing equation can consistently estimate the true risk sharing relationship. We
will then go back to see that the testing equation based on consumption and output
growth cannot consistently estimate risk sharing.
In the case of ARI(1, 1) output: 4Yt = %4Yt−1 + εt, we have derived the
consumption process,
Ct = (1− λ)C̄ + rBt + λ(Yt +
%
(1 + r − %)
∆Yt) (35)
and we can derive the bond holding process,
Bt = B0 −
λ%
1 + r − %
(Yt−1 − Y−1) (36)
where equation (36) holds if we recursively plug CUt−1 to C
U
1 into Bt = Y
U
t−1 +
(1 + r)Bt−1 − CUt−1 and use Y U = λY .
By plugging equation (36) into equation (35), we have













(1− λ)C̄ + rB0 + r
λ%




1 + r − %
Yt−1 + λ(Yt +
%
1 + r − %
∆Yt)
= α− r λ%




%t−sεs) + λ(Yt +
%





where the last equality holds because we let the constant term (1−λ)C̄+ rB0 +
r λ%




(equation (27)), which, as we have shown is 4Yt = %4Yt−1 + εt expressed in
another form.
Recollecting terms,
Ct = α + λ(1−
r%
1 + r − %
)Yt +
(1 + r)λ%




This is a testable equation that can be written into the following fashion:
Ct = α + β
LRYt + ut (37)
where βLR = λ(1 − r%
1+r−%); ut has properties of a causal and invertible ARMA
process with ut =
t∑
s=−∞
ϕt−sεs where ϕ is a function of %, λ and r; and Ct v I(1);
Yt v I(1).
We know that the OLS estimator of βLR, ˆβLR, is a super-consistent estimate
of βLR when equation (37) satises the above properties. ˆβLR is super-consistent
because its asymptotic properties are driven by the series that is I(1). For this
reason, ut is asymptotically irrelevant even though it has complicated dynamics
since it is I(0).24 In Appendix C.1, we showed that plimT→∞ ˆE(βLR) = λ(1 −
r%
1+r−%).
24We derived equation (37) under the assumptions of a quadratic utility function and no aggregate
shocks. If the utility function is in the form of constant relative risk aversion, equation
(37) holds in log terms (Hall (1978)) since now consumption can only be approximated as a
random walk process. If aggregate shocks exist, then we need to rst subtract them out since
aggregate shocks cannot be shared. So, in a general specication, the testing equation will be
ct− cwt = α+βLR(yt− ywt ) +ut, where lower case letters c and y denote log consumption and
output. cw and yw are the world average log consumption and output. We subtract them
from log consumption and output in order to get the idiosyncratic consumption and output.
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The term λ r%
1+r−% is close to zero if the interest rate r is small and 0 ≤ % < 1.
So, even though λ and the estimated βLR are not identical, the dierence is small
empirically given a small interest rate is the case in the real world.
Key message: we can consistently estimate long-run risk sharing by exploring
the nonstationary relationship between consumption and output when the output
process is I(1).
Please note that when % = 0, output process (26) degenerates into random walk
process (11): Yt = Yt−1 +εt where εt = θt. This is Case2 in the tables above. Equa-
tion (37) can still consistently estimate the true risk sharing relationship (which is
λ) since now, βLR = λ and ut = 0 which can be thought of as an i.i.d. white noise
(0, 0) process.
Estimating short-run relationships using dierenced series
When 4Yt = %4Yt−1 + εt, we have derived,
Ct − Ct−1 =
λ(1 + r)
1 + r − %
εt (38)
Substitute εt of equation (38),
Ct − Ct−1 =
λ(1 + r)




1 + r − %
(Yt − Yt−1)−
λ(1 + r)




1 + r − %
(Yt − Yt−1)−
λ(1 + r)





where the last equality holds because we substitute 4Yt−1 using equation (27).
We can rewrite Ct − Ct−1 into
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Ct − Ct−1 = βSR(Yt − Yt−1) + µt (39)
where βSR = λ(1+r)




ψt−1−sεs where ψ is some function of %, λ and r; and Ct − Ct−1 v
I(0); Yt − Yt−1 v I(0).
We know that the OLS estimator of βSR, ˆβSR, is not a consistent estimate of
βSR when the properties of equation (39) is as dened above. Comparing testing
equations (37) and (39), the reason that βLR can be consistently estimated while
βSR cannot is because we explore the nonstationary relationship in equation (37),
which is robust with respect to the dynamics in the error term. However, ˆβSR is
contaminated by the dynamics in the error term of equation (39).25 Please refer
to Appendix C.2 for the probability limit of ˆβSR.
If using dierenced series to test risk sharing in the special case of an AR(1)
output process, we cannot achieve a consistent estimate for a similar reason. We
can briey illustrate this.
When output follows an AR(1) process as Yt = ρYt−1 + ζt, we have derived,
Ct − Ct−1 =
λr
1 + r − ρ
ζt (40)
Plug equation Yt = ρYt−1 + ζt into equation (40)
25This regression can correctly identify short-run eects in special cases of complete insurance
or random walk output. It is simple to check the case of complete insurance where the true
relationship is full risk sharing, i.e., λ = 0. When λ = 0, βSR = 0 and µt = 0 and, therefore,
ˆβSR is a consistent estimate of the true relationship in equation (39). In the case of a random
walk output, % = 0, which makes βSR = λ and µt = 0 . Again, ˆβSR is a consistent estimate
of the true relationship in equation (39).
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Ct − Ct−1 =
λr




1 + r − ρ
(Yt − Yt−1) +
λr




1 + r − ρ
(Yt − Yt−1) +
λr





where the last equality holds because we substitute Yt−1 using equation Yt−1 =∑t−1
s=−∞ ρ
t−1−sζs, which, as we have shown, is the same output process as Yt =
ρYt + ζt.
We can rewrite the last equality of Ct − Ct−1 into the following fashion,
Ct − Ct−1 = βSR(Yt − Yt−1) + µt
where βSR = λr




φt−1−sζs where φ is some function of ρ, λ and r; and Ct − Ct−1 v
I(0); Yt − Yt−1 v I(0).
We know that the OLS estimator of βSR, ˆβSR, is not a consistent estimate of
βSR when the properties of the testing equation are as dened above.
We have nished the discussion on short-run and long-run relationships and
the estimations on them. We would like to summarize the main results into the
following lemma:
Lemma 1
If output is an I(1) process with AR(1) dynamics, dened as equation
(26), the short-run relationship between consumption and output
cannot be consistently estimated through equation (39), except in
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special cases. However, the level of risk sharing, measured by λ, can
be approximated by the estimate on the slope coecient in equation
(37). Mathematically, λ ≈ ˆβLR = λ(1− r%
1+r−%).
Lemma 1 is drawn from the special output process (26), but it can be generalized
for an I(1) output process with causal and invertible ARMA(p, q) dynamics. This
is because no matter what the ARMA process is, as long as it is weakly dependent,
intertemporal smoothing is small in the long run as eects of ARMA shocks die
out. We formalize this generalization into the following lemma:
Lemma 2
If output is an I(1) process with causal and invertible ARMA(p, q)
dynamics, dened as equation (6), the short-run relationship be-
tween consumption and output cannot be consistently estimated
through equation (39), except in special cases. However, the level
of risk sharing, measured by λ, can be approximated by the es-
timate on the slope coecient in equation (37). Mathematically,
λ ≈ ˆβLR = λ(1 − o(1)), where o(1) denotes some small number
which is signicantly smaller than 1.
2.3.2 Identication under General Output Process (6)
So far, in order to achieve analytical results, we have chosen the special output
process (26). However, An output process does not have to be in this special form.
That is, the transitory components of outputs can be AR(1) in one country, AR(2)
in another, and more generally, some ARMA process in a third country. If we
test risk sharing using data from dierent countries, results from a panel short-run
regression will be noisy in the sense that each individual country estimate is biased
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and the biases are driven by dierent dynamics in dierent countries.
If we know the output dynamics of each single country or we can estimate the
output dynamics of each single country, we can make corrections and adjustments
on the estimate of the slope coecient of a short-run regression to achieve a con-
sistent estimate of risk sharing and intertemporal smoothing eects. However, the
problem is that we do not know what the true output process is, and it is dicult
to provide a reliable estimate on output dynamics, especially in the case of country
level studies where we normally only have a couple of decades of time-series data.
Applying the results in Lemma 2, however, a long-run regression of a panel of
countries will still be able to consistently identify the true level of risk sharing,
apart from a small blip. So, our analysis is useful for designing empirical panel
tests on long-run risk sharing when people are faced with both types of shocks.
2.3.3 Other Short-run Distortions
This section is an extension on section 2.3.1. The distortions in this section are
important empirical questions, but they can be handled similarly as transitory
output shocks. This is because the distortions only have short-run eects and die
out over time without inuencing the long run relationships.
Everything else being equal, the relationship between consumption and output
can be aected by taste shocks. In other words, since taste shocks inuence con-
sumption given a particular output process, the estimated βSR moves away from
the risk sharing relationship that we intend to identify. When such shocks are
large, unknown, and erratic, it posts challenges for an empirical study since it is
hard to control them by using observable data. For example, Stockman and Tesar
(1995) have shown that people may choose a non-smooth consumption path due
to changes in preferences. This implies the high frequency relationship between
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consumption and output can be undetermined for a given degree of risk sharing.
However, realizing that taste shocks are transitory shocks, this is not an issue for
the estimation of long-run risk sharing.
Specically, in terms of long-run relationships, Y LRt = 1/(1 − %)εt because the
output process is the same as before; CLRt should still equal (
1+r
1+r−%εt) because
Et(Ct+s) = Ct when s → ∞ as the eects of taste shocks die out. Thus, the
long-run relationship is the same as in section 2.3.1 , implying that taste shocks
are irrelevant in the long run. Please note that a similar argument applies to
market frictions, and other types of short-run distortions, as long as their eects
are transitory.
2.4 Conclusion
The literature on testing risk sharing has found limited risk sharing across coun-
tries. This is in contrast to well documented facts of nancial integration in the
past two decades, measured by cross-country holdings of assets and liabilities (Lane,
2001; lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2003). This paper provides a potential explanation
on the ndings of low risk sharing. We illustrate that a bond economy can in-
tertemporally smooth consumption in face of transitory output shocks, but not for
permanent output shocks. An insurance economy is essential for risk sharing on
permanent shocks. This mechanical dierence requires a careful study of implica-
tions in consumption risk sharing given a certain output process. We have therefore
shown that, when both transitory and permanent shocks exist, an estimate of risk
sharing in a short-run panel regression is inconsistent and contaminated by in-
tertemporal smoothing and other short-run distortions. However, we can achieve
a consistent estimate of risk sharing through a long-run panel regression.
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Chapter 3: Empirical Tests on Cross-country
Consumption Risk Sharing
3.1 Introduction
The complete market benchmark model on consumption risk sharing across coun-
tries predicts that a country's consumption equals a constant portion of current
world output that depends on the country's initial share of world wealth (Obstfeld
and Rogo, 1995). This implies that a country's consumption is independent of,
or orthogonal to, GDP, apart from the global components of its consumption and
GDP. Much of the empirical literature has used panel regressions of country spe-
cic consumption growth on output growth in testing this orthogonal implication
(I call this type of regression a conventional panel regression).26
What is puzzling is the indecisiveness of the ndings in using conventional panel
regressions. It is not surprising that the test and estimate results found limited
risk sharing considering many factors can limit the level of risk sharing in the real
world (Mendoza, 1991; Backus, Kehoe and Kydland, 1992 on market frictions and
restrictions on market institutions; and Obstfeld and Rogo, 1995 on moral hazard
and sovereign risks). It is indecisiveness that makes people doubt if risk sharing
indeed exists in practice. For example, Canova and Ravn (1996) concluded that
risk sharing is almost complete in a short cycle, but not in medium and long cycles.
This contradicts the claim of Artis and Homann (2006) that there is more risk
sharing in the long run than in the short run. Moreover, despite the theoretical
26Kollmann (1995), using nonstationary time-series techniques to test risk sharing, found re-
jection of the null hypothesis of full risk sharing in all country pairs. However, the method
he used, besides the problem of potential low power and high size distortion in a time series
context, can only do a test of full risk sharing or not, but cannot test the degree of risk
sharing.
39
prediction that globalization should reinforce risk sharing through easier access
to more diversied contingency contracts, much of the literature nevertheless did
not nd increases in risk sharing following the recent increase in global nancial
integration (Bai and Zhang, 2006; Moser, Pointer and Scharler, 2004).27 Labhard
and Sawichi (2006), based on a factor analysis approach, even nd a slight decrease
in risk sharing between UK regions and between UK and other OECD countries.
For survey papers, please refer to Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2007) and Corcoran
(2008).
At a basic level, a conventional panel regression requires stationarity of the data
in order to avoid a spurious regression problem and nonstandard distributions for
inference. Therefore, in testing risk sharing, researchers routinely rst-dierence
data on consumption and GDP. As a result of dierencing, the estimates measure
risk sharing on transitory shocks or risks at business cycle frequency. The welfare
gain from risk sharing at business cycle frequency has been found small in the
literature, for example, Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006), Lucas (1987) and Cole
and Obstfeld (1991). The small welfare gain implies the motivation of risk sharing
is low and may be dominated by many other motivations. It is therefore not
surprising that low risk sharing or no increase of risk sharing has been found in
the literature.
If the level of output contains information beyond the information carried through
changes in output that is useful for the decision-making on consumption risk shar-
ing, we should include the level of output in our investigation. Specically, if output
is I(0), i.e., it is mean-reversing, the level of output does not give much additional
information beyond the dierenced output. If output is I(1), dierencing would
remove the permanent component of output that drives the nonstationarity.
27Artis and Homann (2006) and Artis and Homann (2007), among a few papers, found risk
sharing increased in the recent nancial integration period.
40
As discussed below, the welfare gain of risk sharing on permanent shocks should
be much higher than that on transitory shocks. We therefore think it is impor-
tant and interesting to test risk sharing on permanent shocks. In this case, the
estimated consumption risk sharing, identied by the cointegrating coecient in a
nonstationary panel regression model, is long-run risk sharing.
Because our methodology focuses on identifying a long-run cointegrating rela-
tionship, we can allow for full heterogeneity in short-run dynamics. This implies
that we can obtain a consistent estimate of long-run risk sharing while disregard-
ing any short-run nuisance factors. However, in the conventional panel regression
model, without further structure assumption on the model, the dynamics are re-
stricted to be homogeneous.28 As a result, they omit important factors such as the
heterogeneity in short-run dynamics that are caused by intertemporal smoothing,
taste shocks, or market frictions. The recent paper by Artis and Homann (2008)
oers a similar insight. They argue that risk sharing has, in fact, increased fol-
lowing the recent nancial integration, but both the conventional panel regression
and consumption correlation failed to detect this increase due to the change of the
output dynamics in the same period.
Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (2001), and a more recent and close cousin of
it, Flood, Marion and Matsumoto (2008) are among the recent developments in
the literature that have brought us closer to understanding long-run risk sharing.
Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (2001) argued the eect of temporary income
shocks on consumption can be buered through borrowing and lending, but over
longer horizons one can expect consumption growth to closely follow the growth
rate of income. They therefore use the techniques developed in Athanasoulis and
28This is essentially because that conventional panel analysis is an extension of cross-sectional
analysis where it pools the cross-sectional dimension or averages on the cross-sectional di-
mension to achieve an estimate. In other words, it relies on cross-sectional asymptotics for
inference. Therefore, it cannot allow for country-specic slope coecients and dynamics.
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van Wincoop (2000) to test income risk sharing at dierent frequencies between
U.S. states.
Artis and Homann (2006) is the closest paper in the literature to this paper.
They, as we do below, use consumption and GDP levels (instead of growth rates)
on testing and estimating risk sharing, which they hope can get rid of the eects
of short-run confounding factors. However, their regression is essentially under a
conventional panel framework, without taking the nonstationary properties and full
heterogeneity in short-term dynamics into account. Moreover, they use OLS and
a pooled version dynamic OLS, which do not give an estimate of a cointegrating
relationship if the true slope coecient is heterogeneous.
Our results indicate that, for the period of 1950 to 2008, the level of long-run
risk sharing in OECD countries is similar to that in emerging market countries.
However, during the nancial integration episode of the past two decades, long-run
risk sharing in OECD countries has increased much more than in emerging market
countries. Furthermore, we investigate the relationship between various measures
of nancial integration and cross-country risk sharing, but only nd weak evidences
on such linkages.
This chapter is structured as follows. In section 3.2, we discuss the implications of
nancial integration on risk sharing and how long-run risk sharing can be estimated
in a nonstationary panel. Section 3.3 will illustrate model specications pertinent
to the issues in testing and estimating risk sharing. We will discuss our data and
sample selection in section 3.4. Section 3.5 will present our cointegration testing
and estimating results. We examine the distribution patterns of risk sharing and
link it to some nancial integration indicators in section 3.6. Finally, section 3.7
will conclude this chapter.
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3.2 Theoretical Motivations
In order to estimate long-run risk sharing, we need to understand how risk shar-
ing happens when countries open up and nancially integrate with each other. In
fact, nancial integration inuences a country's consumption, given a certain out-
put dynamic, through two functions: state contingent insurance and intertemporal
smoothing. In a nancially integrated world, countries facing uncertain output
streams buy insurance contracts in an insurance market, such as Arrow-Debreu
securities and Shiller portfolios, to share away the idiosyncratic output risks (Ar-
row, 1964; Debreu, 1959; and recently Shiller, 1993). In practice, such insurance
contracts do not exist, so we use cross-country holdings of assets and liabilities
as proxies. If an insurance market is not complete, intertemporal smoothing that
involves intertemporal reallocation of consumption through borrowing and lending
in a risk-free bond market comes into play. If an insurance market is complete, a
bond market is redundant (Constantinides and Dufe, 1996).29
We note that intertemporal smoothing may be preferable when a shock can be
also insured. This is because costs of insurance contracts are higher than costs
of bond contracts due to sovereign risks and moral hazards (Obstfeld and Rogo,
1995). We are not considering sovereign risk and moral hazard explicitly. However,
those types of endogenous imperfections of nancial markets can further limit the
extent of risk sharing (Becker and Homann, 2006).30 We will discuss this when
explaining the empirical results.
These two functions are mechanically dierent and bear dierent welfare impli-
29Another risk sharing institution is government transfer. However, since it is relatively small at
the country level (Asdrubali, Sorensen and Yosha, 1996), and also because this paper focuses
on nancial integration, we do not have it explicitly in this paper. However, we should keep
in mind that the estimated risk sharing has a small portion of the government transfer eect.
30We call the sovereign risk and moral hazard endogenous incompleteness in order to distinguish
them from the exogenous market incompleteness, such as the market for uninsurable non-
tradable goods.
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cations. Beveridge and Nelson (1981) have illustrated that any time series which
exhibits any kind of homogeneous non-stationarity can be decomposed into two
additive components, a weakly dependent stationary series and a pure random
walk. Specically, in terms of an output process, transitory shocks only lead to
output deviating from its current value temporarily and reversing to its current
value in the long run. However, output subject to permanent shocks is not mean-
reversing and thus performs as a random walk process. We therefore say transitory
shocks, which constitute a stationary I(0) process, are second-order, compared to
rst-order nonstationary movement caused by the permanent shocks, which is an
I(1) process.
Baxter and Crucini (1995) conclude that if an output shock has permanent ef-
fects, it can only be shared through an insurance market; a bond market can only
share transitory shocks.31 Therefore, in the context of risk sharing, the determinis-
tic force on a country's consumption is state contingent insurance. Loosely speak-
ing, the permanent component of output, which is driven by permanent shocks,
has an innite variance over time. People therefore face much larger uncertainty
associated with it, compared to the uncertainty associated with the transitory
component. Given permanent shocks can only be shared in an insurance market,
insurance, compared to intertemporal smoothing, bears a much larger welfare gain
(Van Wincoop, 1999; Obstfeld, 1994).32
We can think of this welfare gain using the following example. Let us imagine
31That is, if shocks to GDP are transitory, intertemporal smoothing through borrowing and
lending in a bond market can act as a close substitute for risk sharing. However, if shocks to
GDP are persistent, intertemporal smoothing is not eective due to the persistent nature of
the shocks.
32The statement that the variance of an I(1) process tends to innity is not generally true. Strictly
speaking, if the dierence of an I(1) process is a causal and invertible ARMA process, the
variance goes to innity. In the following part of the paper, it is helpful to think that the
output process is an I(1) process with a causal and invertible ARMA disturbance. For more
details on this, please refer to Leeb and Poetscher (1999) and Prucha (2004).
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the extreme case of a complete insurance market. There are only two countries in
the world, the U.S. and Zimbabwe, which were identical in every aspect 200 years
ago. They signed an insurance contract against idiosyncratic future shocks. Let's
assume that there was a permanent negative shock driving Zimbabwe's GDP per-
manently downward and there was a permanent positive shock driving U.S. GDP
permanently upward after signing the contract. We assume no further permanent
shocks thereafter and reneging of the contract is not possible. We expect today's
consumption in the U.S. would be the same as that in Zimbabwe. Clearly, in long
run terms, insurance is more important and constitutes most of the welfare gain.
It is for this reason a separate investigation of long-run risk sharing is warranted.
Although we are not focusing on risk sharing at business cycle frequency or on
transitory shocks, it is fully addressed in the serial correlation properties of nonsta-
tionary panel analysis. This is because long-run risk sharing involves I(1) movement
of consumption and output while risk sharing on transitory shocks only involves
I(0) stationary movements, which is a lesser order of magnitude and therefore can
be corrected by using internal instruments.
Specically, similar to the literature, we use the relationship between idiosyn-
cratic output per capita and idiosyncratic consumption per capita as a measure of
the risk sharing eect of nancial integration. The dierence is that we explore
the nonstationarity of this relationship. Suppose cit − cwt , t = 1, ..., T has a unit
root for each member i = 1, ..., N , and so does yit − ywi (where cit is log con-
sumption per capita of country i; cwt is log world average consumption per capita;
yit and c
w
t are similarly dened on output; cit − cwt and yit − ywi are therefore id-
iosyncratic log consumption per capita and idiosyncratic log output per capita),
then cit − cwt and yit − ywt form a cointegrated panel if some linear combination,
uit = (cit−cwi )−αi−βi(yit−ywi ), is stationary. The slope coecient βi is the steady
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state cointegrating coecient which indicates a long-run relationship between two
I(1) series that will be maintained forever unless some external shock breaks it. We
interpret the estimated βi as a measure of long-run risk sharing. Since risk shar-
ing on transitory shocks only involves short-run uctuations towards its steady
state equilibrium, it is contained in the error term in such a cointegrated system
(Phillips, 1991).
In brief, long-run risk sharing is dened in contrast to the risk sharing on risks at
business cycle frequency that dominates the literature, where all of the series are
rst dierenced to render stationarity. The nonstationary panel approach allows
us to isolate the long-run steady state relationship from short-run dynamics by
wiping out the confounding eect of intertemporal smoothing and other nuisance
features.
Another advantage of nonstationary panel analysis is that the group mean Fully
Modied OLS (FMOLS) and the group mean Dynamic OLS (DOLS) estimations
can address an important issue in empirical work on risk sharing: the cross country
variation in the steady state of risk sharing. The intuition on this is straightfor-
ward. At the practical level, dierent countries will reasonably choose the level of
cross-country holdings of assets and liabilities to the extent that costs equal bene-
ts. Given that costs and benets may dier across countries and across dierent
contingencies, the level of risk sharing should be dierent. While group-mean non-
stationary specication allows heterogeneous slope coecients, the slope coecient
is forced to be common across countries in a conventional panel specication.33 As
a byproduct of allowing heterogeneity in risk sharing, we can study cross-country
risk sharing distribution and link this distribution pattern to static nancial inte-
33Without exploring time series asymptotics, it is dicult for the conventional panel model to
achieve a reliable estimate on the country specic slope coecient with enough explanatory
power except for the case of Hsiao and Pesaran (2004) where some structures are imposed
on their random coecient model.
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gration indicators.
Another reason for doing this long-run analysis is because the short-run analysis
in the literature nds no or a limited increase in risk sharing during the recent nan-
cial integration period. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003), using carefully collated
data, have shown dramatic increases in international capital ows accompanying
nancial integration. This leaves the puzzle as to whether increased nancial inte-
gration, as indicated by an increase in capital ows, can, in practice, induce higher
risk sharing (Sorensen, Wu, Yosha and Zhu, 2007). Artis and Homann (2008)
found that consumption risk sharing has increased during the nancial integration
period, but the short-run analysis failed to detect it due to the concurrent decline
of output volatility in the short run. Therefore, by splitting our data sample into
a before and after 1990 period, we test changes in risk sharing associated with
nancial integration using the nonstationary panel techniques.34
A branch of the short-run analysis takes advantage of the gross national in-
come (GNI) data available from a country's national accounts to estimate state-
contingent insurance and intertemporal smoothing separately through an out-
put variance decomposition approach initiated by Asdrubali, Sorensen and Yosha
(1996). Using GNI, instead of a consumption series, to estimate state-contingent
insurance seems to get rid of the contamination of intertemporal smoothing in
the most direct way. In fact, although the contamination is not directly from
consumption smoothing in this case, the same arguments apply. The intertem-
poral consideration can endogenously inuence the real level of net factor income
recorded in the national accounts, making it dierent from the potential level of
net factor income (Lane, 2001). Therefore, net factor income can be simultaneous
with output dynamics, and thus bias estimated insurance in a similar way as the
34This data split is in line with the capital ow patterns found in Lane and Miles-Ferretti (2003)
and is consistent with the practice in the literature.
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estimate on risk sharing we argued in the paragraphs above. In addition, it is well
known that factor income from the BOP accounts is not accounted accurately.
This can induce serious measurement problems in a conventional panel regression.
Furthermore, capital gains and losses on investment are not captured in GNI, but
it will provide some kind of risk sharing. For countries holding large portfolios in
equity and FDI, this is especially important since, typically, most returns are in
the form of capital gains or losses.
In addition, the nonstationary panel analysis allows some other features that
turn out to be particularly convenient in testing and estimating long-run risk shar-
ing. For example, at the macro level, everything depends on everything else, thus
it is fair to think that GDP and consumption are interdependent. Just as in time
series nonstationary analysis, we do not need to worry about the simultaneity or
endogeneity problems in the nonstationary panel analysis simply due to the fact
that we are exploring a cointegrating relationship that is an order of magnitude
greater than the simultaneous and endogenous problems that plague the conven-
tional panel analysis. For a similar reason, it is also robust to many forms of omit-
ted variables. Meanwhile, in contrast to time series analysis that is well-known to
be data-demanding with low power and high size distortion in a nite sample, a
nonstationary panel is able to use relatively short time series to infer the long run
while maintaining reliable power and size properties (Pedroni, 2000).
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3.3 Discussion on Conventional and Nonstationary Panel
Approaches
3.3.1 Conventional Panel
In the literature, many researchers used equation (41) or its variants to measure
risk sharing (Appendix D lists studies using conventional panel analysis; for survey
papers, refer to Corcoran, 2008 and Kose, Prasad and Terrones, 2007):
∆cit −∆cwt = αi + βSR(∆yit −∆ywt ) + εit (41)
where ∆cit is the change in log consumption of country i from period t-1 to t; ∆c
w
t
is the change in world average log consumption from period t-1 to t; ∆yit and ∆y
w
t
are dened in the same way on log outputs. ∆yit − ∆ywt , the relative changes of
log output in country i, capture idiosyncratic output risks. βSR is restricted to be
the same across countries.
The idea of using equation (41) to test risk sharing comes from the orthogonality
condition of the benchmark model: E(∆cit − ∆cwt |Xit) = 0 where Xit is a vector
of idiosyncratic risk factors of country i, typically output risks. This orthogonality
condition implies a testable condition of equation (41), βSR = 0. However, it is
well-known that the real world nancial market is incomplete. This led researchers
to adopt a pragmatic approach to interpret the estimated βSR as a measure of
degree of risk sharing.
εit is typically assumed to be i.i.d.(0, σ
2) white noise. Equation (41) is conse-
quently estimated by using panel pooled OLS or xed eect techniques. If the
maintained assumptions of exogenous regressors (in the case of pooled OLS) or
strictly exogenous regressors (in the case of FE) and the rank condition also hold,
consistent estimate of βSR can be achieved when N →∞ and T is xed. However,
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we argue that, empirically, the estimate of βSR in this model specication is biased
for several reasons.
First, if output process has non-trivial short-run dynamics in it, εit cannot be
treated as i.i.d.(0, σ2) process. Actually, εit and ∆yit − ∆ywt are correlated and
the correlation will not go to zero even asymptotically. Chapter 2 has given a
full illustration of this. For the reason of completion and self-containment of this
chapter, I have summarized the main results in Appendix E. 35
We can relax the assumption on εit to allow for heteroskydascity and even ho-
mogeneous serial correlations. If εit is assumed to be serial correlated, it is by
construction treating dynamics. However, because the asymptotic properties of
estimates depend on N → ∞ and xed T in equation (41), the series correlation
across i is required to be the same (Arellano and Bond, 1991). A homogeneous
dynamics implies that the impulse responses to disturbances are the same across
countries in terms of size, shape and convergence speed. In the case of risk shar-
ing, this means the returns of consumption to its long-run equilibrium are the same
across countries. This is simply not realistic. For example, it is just not possible
that the dynamics of US and Zimbabwe are the same in terms of level, length
and even directions. If the latent true dynamic is heterogeneous but is forced to
be homogeneous, we will run into trouble in estimating βSR(Smith and Peseran
1995).
Some may argue that we can treat the dynamics in each country up-front by
estimating the serial correlation properties in εit. However, this approach requires
very long time series data which are not realistically available, especially at the
macro level.
35We assume no aggregate risk in Chapter 2 and in Appendix E. This is why results therein do not
have the terms cwt and y
w
t . Since aggregate risk is not insurable and cannot be intertemporally
smoothed, it is therefore subtracted when applying empirical tests, and only idiosyncratic risk
is left as a result.
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Furthermore, the slope coecient βSR is assumed to be homogeneous in equation
(41). We turned to believe a heterogeneous coecient as discussed. If the true slope
coecient is heterogeneous in nature but forced to be homogeneous in regression
models, the estimated βSR will be biased. Actually, again, all the arguments of
Peseran and Smith (1995) will apply and the OLS estimator, ˆβSR → 1 no matter
what the true value is.
Second, when taste shocks exist, βSR cannot be interpreted as a measure of
risk sharing even if it can be consistently estimated. Taste shocks, and demand
side shocks in general, do not get modeled in equation (41), but they inuence
consumption given a particular output process. As a result, in equation (47) of
Appendix E, besides the true risk sharing eect, there will be an extra term in the
coecient, capturing the eect of taste shocks (For more details on this, please
refer to Chapter 2).
Taste shock can be thought of as another risk factor besides output risks. That
is, the orthogonal condition can be pinned down into E(∆cit − ∆cwt |yit, τit) = 0,
where τit denotes idiosyncratic taste shocks. The eect of taste shock can be
isolated from risk sharing if we can nd reliable measures of it and thus use them
as controls in equation (41). However, taste shocks remain as a black box in the
literature and therefore very dicult to nd quantiable measures on it.
Third, market ineciencies, such as market frictions, can place another layer
of latent dynamics into the system. In standard models, in order to facilitate in
yielding analytical results, market eciency is implicitly assumed. For example, in
deriving equation (47), we have assumed an ecient bond market. It is debatable
if a bond market can be modeled as ecient, but we believe a more general DGP
in a cross-section of countries. For example, it is hard to believe that bond markets
are well developed in emerging markets and can be modeled in the same way as
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that of the U.S. Cavaliere, Fanelli and Gardini (2008) have shown market frictions,
which prevent consumption adjusting to its optimal instantaneously but instead
gradually, can lead to a lower consumption correlation than that standard models
predict. They proceed to attribute the lack of risk sharing documented in previous
research to the misspecication of short-term dynamics. In such cases, we have to
take into account heterogeneous transitional dynamics caused by dierent levels of
market frictions.
Some literature treats the dierencing data at lower frequency in equation (41)
as capturing long-run eect of risk sharing (Canova and Ravn (1996)). Again, this
is only valid under the strong assumption on dynamics which is that εit is i.i.d.
white noise after dierencing at the lower frequency. But for the reason argued
above, we tend to believe that we should specify a model that takes as many lags
as needed to make sure εit is white noise, and we believe that this can only be
accomplished by using the nonstationary panel that we are turning to shortly.
In general, to summarize the discussion above, under the framework of conven-
tional panel analysis, we have to make restrictive assumptions on how the data are
being generated. The problem is, on the one hand, the lack of the unied theo-
retical model that can completely describe the DGP,36 and on the other hand, the
unmeasurability or unavailability of data, for example, the quantiable measure of
taste shocks, hindered the applicability of such empirical specications. However,
it turns out not the case in using the nonstationary panel. In particular, we can
be blind on many aspects of the serial correlation properties of the data generating
process and still be able to achieve consistent estimates on risk sharing eect.
36Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992) had predicted that ve years from now the models that
have been developed will dier from this starting point in fundamental ways, unfortunately,
the development has not been fundamental enough until now.
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3.3.2 Nonstationary Panel
We know that nonstationarity is typical in a macro panel. The presence of non-
stationarity provides us the opportunity to take advantage of its nice properties in
analyzing risk sharing.
In this paper, we use the following equation to test risk sharing.
cit − cwt = αi + βLRi (yit − ywt ) + uit (42)
uit = Ψi(L) · εit (43)
where consumption and output variables are dened the same as those in equation
(41). But instead of working on growth, we deal with levels directly. Noticing
that if yit − ywt ∼ I(1) , and uit ∼ I(0) following some weakly dependent I(0)
process, then cit − cwt ∼ I(1) by construction.37 The subscript i on Ψi(L) means
the dynamics are allowed to be heterogeneous across countries, and εit is i.i.d. white
noise disturbance term.38 Despite simplicity in form, this equation has surprisingly
nice features that can take care of the problems discussed above.
The OLS estimate of βLRi is a consistent estimate. This is because uit is an
I(0) weakly dependent stationary process, the impacts of dynamics contained in
it is an order of magnitude less than the cointegrating relationship βLRi that we
are estimating. As a result, the convergence of OLS estimate (and FMOLS and
DOLS estimate that we will discuss shortly) is determined by the I(1) components.
37Consumption and output being I(1) processes is the necessary condition to explore the cointe-
gration relationship between them. We will test these in the empirical part.
38The regression model of equations (42) and (43) is a generalization of regression model of
equation (41). One the one hand, when uit is i.i.d., equations (42) and (43) degenerate to
equation (41) by taking rst-dierence. On the other hand, equations (42) and (43) include
the permanent component of consumption and output, and therefore estimate a long-run risk
sharing relationship, instead of short-run risk sharing relationship.
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Meanwhile, since intertemporal smoothing aims at smoothing out risks at business
cycle frequency that are caused by transitory output shocks, it is only important
in the short run. Equation (42), however, estimates a long-run relationship, so
the eects of intertemporal smoothing are washed out and βLRi is an proxy on risk
sharing through insurance. In light of these, we interpret the OLS estimate of βLRi
a consistent estimate of long-run risk sharing relationship (For more details, please
refer to Appendix E and Chapter 2).
So far, we have pushed the data generating features into uit and simply hope
it can accommodate them. This is because nonstationary panel analysis applies
nonstationary time series properties into the panel. Time series analysis is all about
how to take care of dynamics that are unknown when you have enough data on T
dimension. Although we do not know the form of Ψi(L) in uit, but the estimation
procedure (step-down procedure in ADF specication or kernel in nonparametric
specication) will give the best estimates on them. This allows us get around
many issues that require strong assumptions in the conventional panel.39 Again,
we emphasize that as a result of the full heterogeneities in uit, we can achieve
consistent estimate on long-run behavior of cross-country risk sharing that are
invariant with respect to the nely detailed structure in short-run dynamics. In
other words, dierent as the case of the conventional panel, we are not making
assumptions on restricting the DGP, but hoping that the full heterogeneities can
be rich enough to include the true data generating mechanism as a special case.
For example, the reasoning above applies to taste shocks. Taste shocks are not
explicitly specied in equation (42), but they are washed out without biasing the
estimation on βLRi since taste shocks are widely regarded as transitory shocks which
39Note that equation (41) estimates risk sharing of transitory shocks. Durlauf and Quah (1999)
argued that conventional panel estimated a high frequency relationship by forcing all the
low frequency relationships into the xed eect. In contrast, despite the use of deterministic
terms, the slope coecient in a cointegrating panel picks up a long-run relationship.
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are captured by the serial correlation of uit.
A broad class of short-term dynamics of consumption, such as market frictions,
can be accommodated in equation (42). In equation (42), the univariants cit − cwt
and yit − ywt both have complicated dynamics and these can lead to more compli-
cated dynamics in uit, but it is OK since the estimation procedure will provide the
best guess on it.
It is well-known that we face data limitations when applying time series anal-
ysis on macroeconomic tests. However, This is not the case for a nonstationary
panel. One of the nice features of a nonstationary panel is that it uses the data on
cross-sectional dimensions to compensate for the relatively short data on tempo-
ral dimensions in order to achieve reliable estimating and testing results (Pedroni,
1997).
An important advantage of nonstationary panel specication is that the equa-
tion (42) above allows for heterogeneous slope coecient, βLRi , which serves to
capture the cross country variations in risk sharing, while in conventional panel
approach that involves stationary variables, the slope coecient, by construction,
is forced to be homogeneous, leaving all the heterogeneities into the xed eect.
As we discussed before, the costs and benets make it hard to believe that the
degree of risk sharing in the U.S. and Zimbabwe are the same. This implies that a
heterogeneous βLRi is required.
40
The reason that βLRi is allowed to be heterogeneous is because of the way of
pooling data in our cointegration test and estimate. There are two ways of pool-
ing the data on cross-sectional dimension and time series dimension based on the
commonality explored across sections. One way assumes the commonality across
40The variation is also caused by dierent intertemporal smoothing eect due to heterogeneous
output processes across countries. But it is small in the long run and therefore not particularly
concerned in empirical tests.
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sections comes from a common βLR and produces within estimator on the cointe-
gration relationship. Another way assumes βLRi is drawn from a common distri-
bution and produces the group mean estimator of cointegration relationship. The
panel estimate, therefore, is an estimate on the limit of the average of individual
βLRi . Economically, it measures how much of idiosyncratic consumption risks in
the world is shared on average. Pedroni (2000) and Pedroni (2001) emphasize the
advantages of using group-mean estimators. Also as a by-product of the group-
mean estimator, we can compare the properties of the distribution of individual
estimates to group mean values.
So far, we explain the terms of cwt and y
w
t in equation (42) as global components
of consumption and output. From the theoretical point of view, the risks that are
global in nature cannot be shared and thus the subtraction of cwt and y
w
t serves to
leave only the idiosyncratic component in check. Meanwhile, from the empirical
point of view, this subtraction can be interpreted as accounting for certain forms of
cross-sectional dependency that may be present in the nonstationary panel. From
a pure econometric point of view, the nonstationary panel approach uses the data
on cross-sectional dimension to compensate the relatively short data on temporal
dimension in order to achieve reliable estimating and testing results. Therefore, we
hope time series data are independent across sections and thus the information in
individual cross section can add to each other. If data are cross section dependent,
that means some information is redundant that reduces power and introduces size
distortion. The eectiveness of cwt and y
w
t in eliminating cross-sectional dependency
depends on the form of true dependency, but it turns out that this simple form
performs reasonably well in many cases, for example, in the case that data are in
part driven by common global business cycles or by a common stochastic trend.
Up to this point, our discussion takes incomplete market as given, but did not
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explain why a market is incomplete. Explaining why a market is not complete is
not the purpose of this paper and please refer to Chapter 6 of Obstfeld and Ro-
go (1995) for theoretical reasons on endogenous market incompleteness, such as
sovereign risk and moral hazard. The point that we want to make is that the es-
timated slope coecient in equation (42) reects those endogenous incompletions.
We point out that it also reects the impact of exogenous incompletion, for exam-
ple, the non-insurability of non-tradable goods and labor incomes. However, we
need to be cautious on the interpretation on the non-insurability of non-tradable
goods and labor incomes because of a ne point about the assumption on the addi-
tivity of the period utility function. Taking the non-tradable goods as an example,
if additivity holds, then we can derive a neat equalized marginal rate of substi-
tutions between countries on the tradable goods and therefore we can interpret
our estimate on the slope coecient of equation (42) as proportional to the case
of tradable goods since the non-tradable goods are included into the regression.
However, if the additivity does not hold, the introduction of the intratemporal
elasticity of substitution and its interaction with the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution rule out a neat relationship between countries on the tradable goods
and therefore, the interpretation can be viewed as a proxy at best.41 In the end,
we can view our risk sharing estimate as a de facto measure of risk sharing.
Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992)'s simulation results show that, in the case of
technology spillover, consumption correlation can be high while output correlation
is low even between the autarky economies. Is our measure of risk sharing subject
to such spillover bias? We justify this from two aspects. One the one hand, our
41The simulation results in the literature show that the impact of non-tradable goods is not
large enough to generate the as low consumption correlation as it is in the data without
assuming extreme intertemporal and intratemporal elasticity of substitution parameters. A
similar nding for the case of leisure. This comforts us in not worrying too much on this ne
point.
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test is a long-run test. If technology spillover is as high as in Backus, Kehoe and
Kydland (1992)'s simulation model, we should see GDP convergence, but this is
not the case of the data (Pedroni, 2008). On the other hand, we have taken the
cross-country dependency of GDP out, and this mutes the impact of technology
spillover (or contagions in general) on our estimated coecient.
3.4 Data and Sample Selection
3.4.1 Dataset
Our data on GDP and consumption are taken from the Penn World Table (PWT)
version 6.2, the latest release in September 2006, and World Economic Outlook
(WEO) April 2009 Publication. PWT contains a set of annual national accounts
economic time series on many countries. It is widely used in the international risk
sharing literature and therefore is convenient for our purpose since it has converted
the expenditure entries into international dollars so that real quantity cross-country
comparisons can be made (for details, please refer to Heston, Summers and Aten,
2006). However, the PWT only has GDP and consumption data up to 2004; in
order to achieve the longest possible temporal dimension information, which is, in
practice, important for the nonstationary analysis, we therefore extended the data
to 2008 by using the national accounts data from WEO.
PWT and WEO covers 188 countries and 176 countries respectively which are
literally almost the whole world. However, before rushing to experiment with all
the covered countries, we must pay sucient regard to empirical limitations to
this particular sample. The PWT starts from 1950. However, for many developing
countries, especially the least developed countries, the data before 1970s are missing
and the data quality grades signal that the reliability of the estimates is of concern.
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Moreover, the restrictions on capital ows, the high risks associated with those
countries, along with the substantial international transfer ows which provides
some kinds of de-couple of consumption and GDP through non-nancial market
mechanism, make it highly debatable if any meaningful risk sharing exists and
therefore can be detected in those countries.
Based on those considerations, we picked 45 OECD and emerging market coun-
tries for which have a data span available from 1950 to 2008. These 45 countries
cover all the 26 OECD countries and all the 22 emerging market countries dened
by the FTSE Group and the Economist, except the East European transitional
economies and Russia.42 Moreover, these 45 countries consist of more than 80
percent of world GDP as of 2008 and thus we believe they are large enough for
us to treat them as a proxy for the whole world. We dene idiosyncratic GDP
per capita and consumption per capita as the country level GDP per capita and
consumption per capita minus the world-wide average of GDP per capita and con-
sumption per capita. Therefore, the higher the risk sharing, the less comovement
between idiosyncratic GDP per capita and idiosyncratic consumption per capita.
From this point on, when we discuss GDP per capita and consumption per capita,
we implicitly mean the idiosyncratic ones, which are the demeaned GDP per capita
and consumption per capita.
3.4.2 Sample Selection
We have made the decision on the data sample that we are going to explore, but
before applying the empirical tests on it, it is worth explaining the strategies used
42The OECD countries include United States, United Kingdom, Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Canada,
Japan, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Australia, New Zealand,
Mexico, Korea. The emerging market countries include Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China,
Colombia, Egypt, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan,
Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand, Turkey.
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to apply the nonstationary techniques in order to achieve robust and informative
results. Basically, any empirical tests are guided by the theoretical models and this
is the rst strategy. Unfortunately, we are facing real world data limitations. If the
data did not show the pattern predicted by the theory, we will not be able to apply
tests on that theory. Therefore, another empirical strategy is to investigate what
the data tell us and sort out the useful data information in testing theories. In
the analysis of this paper, we compromise between the information carried through
data and the prediction made by theories, and use both strategies in our tests and
hope we can cover basis by doing both.
The panel unit root tests on GDP per capita and consumption per capita, as
shown in table 1, signal very strong sign of non-rejection of the null of unit root
for the 45 country sample. The tests of cointegration between GDP per capita and
consumption per capita, as shown in table 2, indicate signicant rejection of the null
of unit root on the error term of equation 42, meaning they are cointegrated. These
ndings are consistent with the predictions of the neoclassical growth model. The
neoclassical growth model tells us that a country's GDP per capita should follow
some kind of non-mean-reversing process if a country has experienced permanent
changes in technologies or in investment rates, and therefore we can model the
GDP per capita as a unit root process. Since we nd consistency between data
and theory, therefore, complying with the rst strategy, we test and estimate long-
run risk sharing on the whole 45 countries.
The panel test results in table 1 and table 2 are constructed by the test results of
the individual country. For example, in table 1, we reported the Im, Pesaran and
Shin Augmented Dick-Fuller (IPS ADF) test statistics which are, in its simplest
form, an average of the individual ADF test statistics. When taking a closer look
at the individual country's unit root test results, reported in table A1, we nd,
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for some countries, the test statistics reject the null of unit root on the GDP per
capita and consumption per capita. This may due to the high size distortion when
coming to time series nonstationary analysis and we should not trust nor pay much
attention to it. But, at a practical level, there is nothing restricting the GDP per
capita of a country has to follow a unit root process within a certain time period.
For example, the technology changes or changes in investment rates may not have
been signicant enough within the sample period to drive the country to move
with unit root characteristics. To include those countries won't break the test
based on the whole sample down. This is because although those countries with
stationary GDP per capita process are not very informative about the risk sharing
relationship that we are interested in, they are an order of magnitude less than
the cointegration relationship and therefore irrelevant asymptotically. However,
for a nite sample, we realize that it increases the noise-to-signal ratio of the long-
run risk sharing analysis. We therefore take out those countries with test results
indicating stationary GDP per capita or consumption per capita.
We proceed to conduct cointegration tests after excluding those countries. The
panel tests continue showing that consumption and GDP are cointegrated, but
individual tests indicate that they are not in many countries (table A2).43 Again,
this could be due to the low power for rejection of the null hypothesis on the er-
ror terms or due to the high size distortion, but to be on the safe side, we take
those countries out. This leaves us with 21 countries, a country sample which con-
tains rich nonstationary information, even for individual countries, and therefore
with signicantly reduced noise-to-signal ratio. The test results on the 21 country
subsample are used as robust checks on the whole sample results.
43In table 2A, only those countries that passed the individual cointegration tests are reported.
But the full results are available from the author up on request.
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3.5 Interpreting the Risk Sharing Relationship
3.5.1 FMOLS and DOLS
We estimate the slope coecient, βLRi , of equation (42) using group mean FMOLS
and group mean DOLS techniques and interpret the estimated βLRi as a measure of
de facto risk sharing. Depending on the way of pooling the information on time
series and cross sectional dimensions of the panel, and depending on the paramet-
ric or nonparametric estimation approaches, the econometricians have developed
several dierent versions of estimators on the panel cointegrating coecient. For
the details, please refer to Phillips and Moon (1997), Mark and Sue (1999) and
Kao (1997) for the pooled estimators, and Pedroni (2000) and Pedroni (2001)
for the group mean estimators.
We pick the group mean estimators, instead of the pooled versions because the
pooled versions have a maintained assumption which treats the slope coecient
of the cointegrating relationship as common value. This maintained assumption
not only restricts the applicability of the pooled estimators in the context of risk
sharing, but also restricts the opportunities for us to investigate cross-country risk
sharing distribution. Moreover, the group mean estimators perform better small
sample size properties than the pooled estimators in the Monte Carlo simulations
shown in Pedroni (2000). In addition, Pedroni (2001) shows that the group mean
FMOLS and DOLS both tend to perform well in small samples in terms of size
distortion, but since DOLS is a parametric-based test, it does better in terms of
power when sample is very short which would be the case of this paper when we
apply our test for the period post-1990. Therefore, we do both FMOLS and DOLS
in order to cover all bases.44
44We only report risk sharing estimates using FMOLS since the estimates are similar using
DOLS. The DOLS estimates are available up on request.
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The FMOLS estimator was rst developed by Phillips and Hansen (1990) in the
time series context. Pedroni (2000) extended it into panel context and developed
the group mean FMOLS estimator, which allows both heterogeneous dynamics and
heterogeneous cointegrating vectors. The basic idea of the group mean FMOLS
estimator is straightforward and can be interpreted as the cross-country average of
the individual country FMOLS estimators, where the individual FMOLS estimator
has been corrected for serial correlation and for endogeneity through a long-run
covariance matrix. The correction can be achieved because of the fact that the
cointegration relationship is an order of magnitude higher than the biases induced
by serial correlations and endogeneities and therefore the dierentiated regressors
can serve as internal instruments to get rid of the biases therein.
In the context of risk sharing, this correction means that the eects of intertem-
poral smoothing, taste shock and some other serial correlation due to transitional
dynamics have been wiped out. Therefore, the estimated slope coecient in equa-
tion (42) represents the long-run steady state relationship between GDP and con-
sumption which survives even with the presence of transitional dynamics which
temporarily drives away the economies from the steady state.45 For the asymp-
totic properties of the group mean FMOLS estimator and the steps on how to
construct group mean FMOLS in a context of applied econometrics, please refer to
Appendix F. Here, we just lay out the group mean FMOLS estimator to see how
it is dierent as the conventional panel estimator and how it allows us to study the
distribution of the individual country estimates:
45We are not discussing the group mean DOLS estimator since the idea is the same. The
dierence is the econometric technique to achieve the serial correlation and endogeneity biases.
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where, in order to keep the notation as simple as possible, we use y and x to
replace c− cw and y − yw. x∗it = xit − Ω̂21i/Ω̂22i M xit, indicating the xit has been
transformed by an adjusting term which serves as the internal instrument; and
γ̂i = Γ̂21i + Ω̂
0
21i − Ω̂21i/Ω̂22i(Γ̂22i + Ω̂022i), acting as the long-run covariance matrix.
The point we want to make from equation (44) is that the group-mean FMOLS
estimator, β̂LR
GFM
, looks very similar to the OLS estimator of conventional panel,
except for two features. The OLS estimator achieves the estimate on slope coe-
cient by minimizing the sum of mean squared errors of x on y. The group mean
FMOLS does the same, but on top of a transformation of x and a long-run adjust-
ment. In looking closer to this transformation and adjustment, we can nd that
this is a specic feature of the nonstationary panel because the transformation and
adjustment only survive if the x and y are nonstationary. If, the x and y are I(0)
as in the case of conventional data, they are in the same order of magnitude as
the transformation and adjustment terms which makes such transformation and
adjustment unfeasible.
To summarize, provided x and y are I(1), we can take advantage of the non-
stationary panel features to achieve the cointegrating relationship estimate which
indicates the level of risk sharing in our context. However, the conventional panel
analysis, including the dynamic panel analysis such as Arrellano and Bond GMM,
as long as it deals with the I(0) process, is subject to rst order biases due to the
serial correlations which are hard to correct.
The second feature is that the group mean FMOLS allows us to study the
cross-country risk sharing distribution. We have mentioned that we can inter-
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pret the group mean FMOLS as the cross-country average of the individual coun-



















it−T γ̂i) is the individ-
ual country FMOLS time series estimator.
3.5.2 Conventional Panel Regression Results
We rst check the estimates on risk sharing using conventional panel regression
techniques, both in dierence and in level. The results are reported in Table 2
and Table 3 respectively. Column 1 of each table reports pooled OLS estimates
and Column 2 of each table reports xed eect estimates. The results are similar
across the two specications.
The results are comparable with the ndings in the literature. Basically, as
shown in the rst panel of table 2, for the whole sample period, an estimate of
about 32 percent of business cycle frequency risks has been shared. However,
this constitutes risk sharing through both insurance and intertemporal smoothing.
In the case when risk free bond market can act as a close substitute on insurance
market, most of the risk sharing should be carried through intertemporal smoothing
because insurance contract is more risky and costly due to the moral hazard or
contract enforcement issues, especially at the international level. Therefore, out of
the 32 percent, it is fair to reasonably think that only a small portion is through
insurance market (for theoretical ndings and empirical results on this, please refer
to Baxter and Crucini, 1995 and Artis and Homann, 2006).
By comparing the estimates before and after 1990 in the 2nd and 3rd columns of
table 2, a conclusion that would have been drawn is that we do not nd increasing in
risk sharing in the recent nancial integration period. This is puzzling and counter-
intuitive to the standard model's prediction. Our explanation, in keeping with the
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argument of this paper, are two-fold. One is that the low and no increase in risk-
sharing through insurance market on business cycle frequency risks is due to the
low welfare gains. Another is that the misspecication and restrictive assumptions
in the short-run dynamics hinder the capability to achieve an estimate of true β.
Table 3 reports results on estimates of long-run risk sharing by using pooled
OLS and FE. The results indicate that less than 9 percent of long-run risks have
been shared when estimated by pooled OLS in the whole 1960 to 2008 period,
but around 18 percent when estimated by FE. The higher estimates in the FE
specication make better sense. Some of the country-idiosyncratic factors, that
is, factors beyond idiosyncratic output, cannot be shared through nancial market
and we should take them into consideration by using xed eect.
Comparing the estimates before and after 1990 in the 2nd and 3rd columns of
table 3, there is still not much increase in risk sharing. The issue is how much we
can trust the estimates in table 3 in general. We know that OLS can achieve a
consistent estimate on the cointegrating coecient, but there is a second-order bias
associated with it. The second order-bias does not appear even asymptotically. In
a nite sample, we suspect that the second-order bias may turn out to be rst-order
bias, which seriously inuences the reliability of these estimates.
3.5.3 Nonstationary Panel Regression Results
We report the long-run risk sharing estimates on the 45 country sample and its
subgroups in table 4A. For the panel of 45 countries in the period of 1950-2008, the
point estimate shows about 14 percent of long-run risks have been shared. The t-
statistics on testing the null hypothesis of full risk sharing is 112.92, which indicates
far from complete risk sharing; on the other hand, the t-statistics on testing the
null of no risk sharing points to the existence of economically and statistically
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signicant risk sharing. We also performed estimates by splitting our sample into
two periods. In the recent nancial integration period, long-run risk sharing among
the 45 countries more than doubled that in the pre-1990 period, reaching from 12
percent to 27 percent.
The estimates and test results on sub-country groups oer more insights. The
risk sharing of OECD countries are at a similar level as the risk sharing of emerging
markets on the whole sample period. However, in the nancial integration period,
about 34 percent of risks are shared for OECD countries, while only about 23
percent of risks are shared for emerging market countries. More importantly, the
benets of risk sharing are evenly enjoyed within OECD country groups. This is
not the case for emerging markets. It seems that most of the benets of nancial
integration are enjoyed by the advanced emerging markets.46
It looks a bit puzzling that the risk sharing of EU countries is only about 10
percent for the whole sample period, and only about 6 percent for the pre-1990
period. We therefore have done an intra-region risk sharing analysis. The results
appear in the memorandum panel of Table 4A. When testing risk sharing among
only OECD countries, it shows that risk sharing is higher than risk sharing between
OECD countries and the rest of the world for the whole sample period and for the
pre-1990 period, but the levels of risk sharing are similar in the post-1990 period.
This indicates that the markets between OECD and emerging markets are more
isolated before nancial integration. A comparison of risk sharing within EU15
countries and the risk sharing between EU15 and the rest of the world, however
indicates that EU15 countries used to share risks mostly among themselves, but
more risks are shared with the rest of the world in the post-1990 period (risk
46One reason is that advanced countries are less debt vulnerable and more FDI-oriented. So it is
interesting for future research to test risk sharing across dierent asset classes. For example,
the FDI insurance may perform better than debt insurance since it is not as expected to be
paid back as much as debt.
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sharing is about 24 percent within EU15 after 1990, but about 36 percent with
rest of the world). A similar story applies to other advanced countries. They used
to share more risks among themselves, but now share more risks with EU countries
and emerging market.
As a robust check, table 4B shows the long-run risk sharing estimates on the 21
country sample. Since we do not have enough countries on the cross-section to do
a detailed breakdown on country groups, we only estimate the risk sharing on a
sample of 21 countries, a sample of 11 OECD countries and 10 emerging market
countries. The results basically show the same picture as the tests on the full
sample of 45 countries. We nd that the risk sharing estimate on the panel of 21
countries is 14 percent for the whole sample period and increases to 39 percent in
the nancial integration period. The increase is entirely due to more risk sharing
in the OECD countries though.
3.6 Cross-country Risk Sharing Patterns
The group mean FMOLS does not restrict the slope coecient to be homoge-
neous, and we can therefore look into the heterogeneous cross-country patterns of
risk sharing by looking into the estimates of cointegrating coecients on individ-
ual countries. We know that the estimates are not reliable individually, i.e., each
of them is a poor estimate of the true cointegrating relationship due to the high
size distortion of our short sample, but each of them is an asymptotically consis-
tent estimate, and so the pooling of the individual estimates should show some
consistent pattern. We report in Appendix Tables A3a and A3b the estimates of
cointegrating coecients of individual countries. The dierence between Tables
A3a and A3b is due to the dierent strategy we used in data sampling.
The measures on nancial integration are from the updated and extended version
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of a dataset constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). It contains data for
the period 1970-2007 and for 178 economies plus the euro area as an aggregate. For
each of the countries, it reports total external assets and liabilities and associated
breakdowns. We constructed our measure of nancial integration by rst splitting
the data into a pre- and post- 1990 period. We then calculated the average of
total assets and liabilities, the average of portfolio equity assets and liabilities, the
average of FDI assets and liabilities, and the average of debt assets and liabilities
on the split periods for each country of our sample. The panel gure shows the
linkage of risk sharing pattern with such calculated nancial integration measures.
The rst chart in the panel shows that long-run risk sharing is positively corre-
lated with the gross asset and liability to GDP ratio in the pre-1990 period. This
is expected from the theoretical model's prediction. The second chart shows a
weaker positive relationship for the post-1990 period. As you can see from the
x-axis, the gross capital ow, on average, quadrupled compared to the pre-1990
period. If we take out the observation of Ireland as an outlier, then it almost
tripled. However, as we have seen in our tables, long-run risk sharing, on average,
only doubled during the same episode. This indicates that the pace of increase
in long-run risk sharing does not catch up with the pace of increase in nancial
ows. It is therefore too strong to claim that risk sharing and nancial ows are
twins separated at birth. Financial integration is the necessary condition for risk
sharing, but it is not sucient, i.e., more liberal nancial ows do not necessarily
carry out proportionally more risk sharing. As pointed out by Kose, Prasad and
Terrones (2007), threshold eects can be a potential explanation.
The middle two charts in the panel show the relationship between long-run risk
sharing and the gross FDI and portfolio to GDP ratio. The bottom two charts
show the relationship with the debt to GDP ratio. Two features are worth noting.
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One is that most of the increase in nancial ows in the post-1990 period is driven
by the increase of FDI and portfolio. FDI and portfolio as a percent of GDP
quadrupled in the post-1990 period compared to the pre-1990 period. But the
debt to GDP ratio only doubled if we take out Ireland. The second feature is that
they both conrm the relationship of the top two charts, with post-1990 showing
a less positive relationship.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we specify an empirical nonstationary panel regression model that
tests long-run risk sharing and allows for richer data generating processes. This is
in contrast to the literature on consumption risk sharing, which is mainly about
risks at business cycle frequency. Since our methodology focuses on identifying
cointegrating relationships while allowing for arbitrary short-run dynamics, we
can obtain a consistent estimate of long-run risk sharing while disregarding any
short-run nuisance factors. Furthermore, the combination of a focus on the long-
run low frequency relationship and the dimensionality of the panel allows us to
study the distribution pattern of cross-country risk sharing. We therefore can link
the distribution pattern to various measures of nancial integration.
Our results show that, for the period of 1950-2008, about 14 percent of long-run
risk has been shared in OECD countries and emerging market countries. However,
during the nancial integration episode of the past two decades, long-run risk
sharing in OECD countries increased more than in emerging market countries,
with about 34 percent of risks shared in OECD countries and about 23 percent in
emerging market countries. These results are robust to our sample selection.
When investigating the relationships between various measures of nancial inte-
gration and cross-country risk sharing, we nd evidence of positive relationships,
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i.e., more capital ows are associated with more long-run risk sharing. However,
the positive relationships are smaller in the recent nancial integration period,




This dissertation concerns testing cross-country consumption risk sharing using
panel regressions. The existing literature on testing risk sharing has found limited
risk sharing across countries. This is in contrast to the prediction of a standard
benchmark model and the well documented facts of nancial integration in the past
two decades. Chapter 2 of this dissertation set up a model that provides a potential
explanation on the ndings of low risk sharing. We illustrate that a bond economy
can intertemporally smooth consumption in face of transitory output shocks, but
not for output shocks that have permanent eects. An insurance economy is es-
sential for risk sharing on permanent shocks. This mechanical dierence requires
a careful study of the implications of risk sharing on consumption given a certain
output process. We have therefore shown that, when both transitory and per-
manent shocks exist, the short-run risk sharing relationship between consumption
and output cannot be consistently estimated in a panel regression due to untreated
short-run dynamics. However, we can consistently estimate a long-run risk shar-
ing relationship because the distortion caused by short-run dynamics goes to zero
asymptotically.
In Chapter 3, we provided empirical tests on long-run risk sharing by estimating
a nonstationary panel regression model. Since our methodology focuses on identi-
fying cointegrating relationships while allowing for arbitrary short-run dynamics,
we can obtain a consistent estimate of long-run risk sharing while disregarding any
short-run nuisance factors.
Our results show that, for the period of 1950-2008, about 14 percent of long-run
risk has been shared in OECD countries and emerging market countries. However,
during the nancial integration episode of the past two decades, long-run risk
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sharing in OECD countries increased more than in emerging market countries,
with about 34 percent of risks shared in OECD countries and about 23 percent of
risks shared in emerging market countries. These results are robust to our sample
selection.
When investigating the relationships between various measures of nancial inte-
gration and cross-country risk sharing, we nd evidence of positive relationships,
i.e., more capital ows are associated with more long-run risk sharing. However,
the positive relationships are smaller in the recent nancial integration period,
indicating that the increase of risk sharing is not proportional to the increase in
capital ows.
Future research will be in two directions. One is to investigate what drives the
dierent level of risk sharing across country groups. Does the level of risk sharing
link to certain features of a country, such as income levels and institutional devel-
opment (leading to dierences in asset and liability classes), and, more generally,
demographic characteristics? Another direction is to explain why the increase of
risk sharing lags behind the increase in capital ows in the recent nancial inte-
gration period. Sorensen, Wu, Yosha and Zhu (2007) found capital home bias
and low risk sharing are twin puzzles separated at birth. To a certain degree, this
argument cannot be wrong. But the ndings of Chapter 3 indicate there are forces






Table 1. Panel Unit Root and Cointegration Test Results (45 countries)
Unit root GDP Consumption
 IPS ADF (large sample adjustment values)  3.21*** 1.09***
 IPS ADF (Bootstrapped)  0.84*** -0.01***
 MW (Bootstrapped) 84.73*** 89.42***
Cointegration ADF PP Rho
 Group mean panel -2.71*** -4.24*** -3.74***
 Pooled Panel -1.16 -2.67*** -2.06***






Table 2: Conventional Panel Regression Results under Different Specifications 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)
1960-2008 Pooled OLS Pooled OLS FE OLS FE OLS 
GDP growth 0.680 0.681 0.669 0.669 
 (0.055)*** (0.059)*** (0.062)*** (0.067)*** 
Constant 0.001 0.017 0.001 0.018 
 (0.001)* (0.007)** (0.001)* (0.007)*** 
Observations 2535 2535 2535 2535 
R-squared 0.31 0.33 0.29 0.31 
     
Pre 1990 
GDP growth 0.641 0.642 0.624 0.621 
 (0.070)*** (0.076)*** (0.079)*** (0.087)*** 
Constant 0.002 0.011 0.002 0.020 
 (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.007)*** 
Observations 1680 1680 1680 1680 
R-squared 0.27 0.28 0.25 0.26 
     
Post 1990 
GDP growth 0.809 0.807 0.803 0.800 
 (0.045)*** (0.045)*** (0.061)*** (0.060)*** 
Constant 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
Observations 855 855 855 855 
R-squared 0.50 0.51 0.46 0.46 
     
Year dummy No Yes No Yes 
Number of countries 45 45 45 45 
     
Robust standard errors in parentheses     






















Table 3: Level Panel Regression Results under Different Specifications 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)
1960-2008 Pooled OLS Pooled OLS FE OLS FE OLS 
GDP growth 0.912 0.912 0.796 0.794 
 (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.012)*** (0.013)*** 
Constant 0.009 0.022 -0.023 -0.056 
 (0.004)** (0.031) (0.004)*** (0.021)*** 
Observations 2580 2580 2580 2580 
R-squared 0.95 0.95 0.78 0.78 
 
Pre 1990     
GDP growth 0.912 0.912 0.801 0.797 
 (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.024)*** (0.026)*** 
Constant 0.011 0.022 -0.022 -0.061 
 (0.005)** (0.031) (0.007)*** (0.021)*** 
Observations 1725 1725 1725 1725 
R-squared 0.95 0.95 0.65 0.66 
 
Post 1990     
GDP growth 0.911 0.911 0.826 0.824 
 (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.024)*** (0.025)*** 
Constant 0.006 0.005 -0.015 -0.023 
 (0.006) (0.032) (0.006)*** (0.009)** 
Observations 855 855 855 855 
R-squared 0.95 0.95 0.71 0.71 
     
Year dummy No Yes No Yes 
Number of countries 45 45 45 45 
     
Robust standard errors in parentheses     























Table 4A. Country Group Cointegration Coefficient Estimates
Whole sample period Before 1990 After 1990
Group Coefficient t-statistic (b=0) t-statistic (b=1) Coefficient t-statistic (b=0) t-statistic (b=1) Coefficient t-statistic (b=0) t-statistic (b=1)
Full Panel (45) 0.86 112.92 -17.81 0.88 119.56 -13.84 0.73 108.55 -26.56
OECD (26) 0.88 89.07 -11.04 0.90 105.84 -7.43 0.66 77.08 -26.53
EU15 0.91 55.41 -4.59 0.94 80.33 0.54 0.64 56.17 -20.42
Euro area 12 0.88 56.51 -5.79 0.94 82.14 1.11 0.66 55.61 -22.65
Other advanced countries (11) 0.84 72.23 -11.61 0.84 68.92 -12.06 0.68 52.91 -16.94
Emerging market (22) 0.86 86.24 -16.22 0.86 69.86 -14.92 0.77 81.36 -11.92
Advanced emerging markets (8) 0.79 72.22 -12.85 0.79 57.69 -9.87 0.65 21.63 -9.72
Other emerging markets 0.90 52.96 -10.54 0.91 43.53 -11.23 0.84 86.44 -7.53
Memorandum
Intra region risk sharing
OECD (26) 0.80 112.99 -22.67 0.86 121.79 -15.2 0.65 69.79 -30.29
EU15 0.84 94.96 -10.02 0.92 97.29 -3.15 0.76 80.65 -24.07
Advanced emerging markets (8) 0.73 48.40 -10.84 0.55 28.57 -9.93 0.71 18.44 -8.78
Note 1: Advanced emerging markets includes all the countries defined by the Economist and Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI), 
which are South Africa, Brazil, Mexico, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Hong Kong, Korea and singapore, except the two transitional economies: Hungary and Poland.
Note 2: the high coefficients on OECD, esp. on EU 15 and Euro 12 indicate that before financial integration, EU countries did very small risk sharing with rest of the world.
Table 4B. Country Group Cointegration Coefficient Estimates (Countries passed individual tests)
Whole sample period Before 1990 After 1990
Group Coefficient t-statistic (b=0) t-statistic (b=1) Coefficient t-statistic (b=0) t-statistic (b=1) Coefficient t-statistic (b=0) t-statistic (b=1)
Full Panel (21) 0.86 126.14 -19.11 0.83 107.12 -16.63 0.71 94.62 -22.87
OECD (11) 0.90 97.78 -10.62 0.86 89.53 -7.28 0.63 65.36 -22.25
Emerging market (10) 0.80 102.06 -21.69 0.80 72.73 -20.55 0.82 73.55 -10.03
Advanced emerging markets includes all the countries defined by the Economist and Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI), 
which are South Africa, Brazil, Mexico, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Hong Kong, Korea and singapore, except the two transitional economies: Hungary and Poland.
Note: the high coefficients on OECD, esp. on EU 15 and Euro 12 indicate that before financial integration, EU countries did very small risk sharing with rest of the world.
OECD: Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Sweden, Switzerland, Canada, Japan, Ireland, Spain, Australia, New Zealand and Korea.






Figure: Cross-country Risk Sharing and Financial Assets











0 50 100 150 200 250 300
Pre-1990, postive correlation between risk sharing 










0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200











0 20 40 60
Pre-1990, postive correlation between risk sharing 










0 100 200 300 400












0 50 100 150 200
Pre-1990, postive correlation between risk sharing 










0 200 400 600 800






Table A1. Indiviudal and Panel Unit Root Test Results 1950-2008 (45 countries)
GDP Consumption
Country ADF pval lags ADF pval lags
United States    0.21 0.953 8 -0.98 0.714 8
United Kingdom   -0.94 0.723 8 -0.76 0.777 8
Austria          -1.11 0.676 3 -1.36 0.578 3
Belgium          -1.90 0.304 8 -1.48 0.486 6
Denmark          0.31 0.942 8 0.14 0.937 6
France           -1.23 0.595 8 -1.86 0.328 8
Germany          -0.80 0.737 3 -1.66 0.451 3
Italy            -0.85 0.139 6 -1.42 0.548 3
Luxembourg       -0.92 0.709 5 -1.22 0.628 8
Netherlands      0.18 0.963 6 -1.15 0.666 5
Norway           -1.47 0.505 8 -5.2 0.001 0
Sweden           0.27 0.952 8 0.64 0.98 8
Switzerland      0.25 0.946 7 0.29 0.93 8
Canada           0.41 0.971 8 -0.44 0.855 8
Japan            -1.69 0.426 2 -1.39 0.56 3
Finland          -1.59 0.477 2 -5.25 0.001 0
Greece           -2.38 0.156 8 -1.69 0.417 8
Iceland          -3.75 0.003 0 -1.45 0.519 5
Ireland          -1.87 0.244 8 -2.42 0.112 0
Portugal         -4.35 0.004 0 -1.99 0.251 8
Spain            -1.93 0.300 7 -2.37 0.141 8
Turkey           -4.39 0.001 6 -1.82 0.325 5
Australia        0.59 0.972 8 -0.5 0.835 8
New Zealand      -0.50 0.855 2 -1.33 0.544 8
South Africa     -0.47 0.794 8 -1.54 0.517 1
Argentina        -0.62 0.882 0 -0.81 0.813 0
Brazil           -1.34 0.551 8 -1.64 0.475 2
Chile            -1.93 0.347 5 -2.57 0.099 0
Colombia         -0.63 0.803 8 -0.31 0.907 4
Mexico           -0.27 0.927 2 -2.37 0.15 0
Peru             -0.93 0.762 1 -1.36 0.594 7
Israel           -1.80 0.353 8 -0.23 0.878 7
Saudi Arabia     -1.28 0.562 5 -0.94 0.649 7
Egypt            -0.92 0.740 6 -0.97 0.696 8
Hong Kong -0.98 0.720 3 -1.69 0.454 1
India            0.38 0.930 8 -2.18 0.202 6
Indonesia        -0.97 0.751 1 -0.88 0.671 8
Korea            -1.00 0.610 5 -0.72 0.688 5
Malaysia         -1.08 0.679 3 -0.74 0.813 1
Pakistan         -1.27 0.575 8 -2.64 0.088 7
Philippines      -1.14 0.673 4 -1.58 0.437 8
Singapore        -1.37 0.563 1 -1.02 0.743 1
Thailand         -0.79 0.694 7 -0.42 0.881 3
Morocco          -3.29 0.025 0 -2.06 0.284 2
China 0.00 0.803 6 0.23 0.898 4
 IPS ADF (large sample adjustment values)  3.21 0.999 8 1.09 0.999 8
 IPS ADF (Bootstrapped)  0.84 0.800 8 -0.01 0.495 8
MW (Bootstrapped) 84.73 0.637 8 89.42 0.498 8






Table A2. Indiviudal and Panel Cointegrated Test Results 1960-2008
ADF P value lags PP P value
Country
Austria          -3.50 0.012 3 -4.56 0.001
Belgium          -2.06 0.239 3 -2.7 0.07
Luxembourg       -2.86 0.058 1 -4.24 0.002
Sweden           -3.11 0.035 0 -3.15 0.03
Switzerland      -3.24 0.021 0 -3.15 0.027
Canada           -3.18 0.027 1 -2.44 0.139
Japan            -2.84 0.053 1 -3.91 0.006
Ireland          -3.51 0.013 0 -3.71 0.01
Spain            -2.73 0.070 0 -3.04 0.041
Australia        -3.35 0.016 0 -3.57 0.012
New Zealand      -2.79 0.060 0 -2.95 0.04
South Africa     -3.04 0.041 1 -2.6 0.101
Argentina        -3.96 0.003 1 -3.35 0.018
Chile            -2.67 0.091 0 -2.61 0.107
Hong Kong -5.34 0.002 2 -3.46 0.017
Korea            -3.97 0.004 0 -3.87 0.005
Malaysia         -3.82 0.007 1 -2.93 0.055
Pakistan         -2.81 0.063 3 -2.56 0.11
Singapore        -4.49 0.002 1 -2.84 0.064
Thailand         -3.68 0.010 0 -3.87 0.008
China, P. R.: Ma -3.22 0.029 2 -3.44 0.013
Group mean panel -7.25 0.000 4 -7.36 0.0000
Pooled panel -6.32 0.000 4 -7.02 0.0000






Table A3a. Cointegration coefficient estimates
1950-2008 Before 1990 After 1990
Country Coefficient t-statistic (b=0) t-statistic (b=1) Coefficient t-statistic (b=0) t-statistic (b=1) Coefficient t-statistic (b=0) t-statistic (b=1)
United States 0.33 1.26 -2.59 0.54 3.27 -2.82 -0.07 -0.58 -9.00
United Kingdom 0.46 1.58 -1.88 0.87 11.63 -1.81 -0.51 -1.54 -4.56
Austria 1.20 53.97 9.17 1.20 59.75 9.98 1.11 25.24 2.44
Belgium 0.88 16.82 -2.19 0.90 18.00 -2.05 0.85 20.98 -3.71
Denmark 1.18 5.44 0.85 0.88 6.22 -0.87 0.78 6.46 -1.86
France 1.03 19.44 0.64 1.14 53.63 6.76 0.64 10.67 -6.03
Germany 0.98 5.17 -0.10 1.63 13.97 5.40 0.81 44.10 -10.03
Italy 1.05 6.35 0.31 1.19 28.09 4.46 0.65 20.89 -11.25
Luxembourg 0.49 3.29 -3.46 0.33 0.98 -2.02 -0.04 -0.20 -5.88
Netherlands 1.13 7.01 0.78 1.04 6.34 0.26 0.99 17.92 -0.14
Norway 0.41 6.89 -9.83 0.57 16.64 -12.44 0.81 7.82 -1.86
Sweden 1.39 11.85 3.31 1.12 8.70 0.95 1.41 19.96 5.77
Switzerland 0.88 24.48 -3.24 0.78 14.55 -4.02 0.76 63.06 -19.87
Canada 1.01 12.29 0.16 0.85 10.19 -1.78 0.59 5.26 -3.73
Japan 0.95 57.09 -2.89 0.95 72.85 -4.06 0.78 35.13 -9.99
Finland 0.85 13.63 -2.43 0.88 25.84 -3.49 0.69 6.45 -2.88
Greece 0.77 5.39 -1.59 0.82 15.53 -3.37 0.80 7.30 -1.86
Iceland 1.20 14.51 2.41 1.19 20.12 3.23 1.63 6.35 2.45
Ireland 0.48 13.11 -14.04 0.41 3.72 -5.47 0.56 26.38 -20.47
Portugal 0.79 15.68 -4.29 0.80 14.85 -3.64 0.39 9.43 -15.03
Spain 0.93 35.88 -2.86 0.94 43.87 -2.98 0.49 3.49 -3.61
Turkey 1.01 4.63 0.03 0.74 6.56 -2.27 1.49 26.34 8.66
Australia 0.83 10.86 -2.29 0.94 14.02 -0.82 0.42 3.53 -4.95
New Zealand 0.96 15.66 -0.65 1.08 14.26 1.07 -0.25 -1.84 -9.08
South Africa 0.75 13.46 -4.46 0.90 9.31 -0.99 0.55 3.30 -2.65
Argentina 0.90 39.29 -4.58 0.92 31.57 -2.70 1.02 24.85 0.57
Brazil 1.05 5.35 0.24 1.36 18.16 4.76 0.31 2.52 -5.56
Chile 0.80 5.04 -1.26 0.72 5.59 -2.18 1.31 36.29 8.58
Colombia 1.40 9.84 2.81 0.74 10.57 -3.79 1.66 33.88 13.42
Mexico 0.82 8.45 -1.81 0.77 6.90 -2.05 0.51 5.00 -4.81
Peru 0.84 6.88 -1.31 0.59 1.69 -1.16 0.76 4.21 -1.32
Israel 0.57 2.64 -1.98 0.54 5.51 -4.63 -0.09 -0.72 -8.45
Saudi Arabia 0.44 2.47 -3.11 0.17 0.66 -3.10 1.47 8.21 2.64
Egypt 0.36 4.64 -8.40 0.50 4.86 -4.89 2.54 19.07 11.56
Hong Kong 1.10 55.80 4.85 1.07 48.47 3.29 1.24 13.24 2.59
India 0.45 2.27 -2.77 1.50 6.01 2.01 0.69 41.58 -18.81
Indonesia 1.67 10.95 4.38 1.32 6.71 1.64 -0.58 -2.01 -5.49
Korea 0.82 83.44 -17.81 0.78 49.24 -14.01 0.86 25.41 -3.99
Malaysia 0.67 18.43 -8.98 0.60 10.19 -6.93 0.75 6.96 -2.35
Pakistan 0.76 4.85 -1.52 0.99 6.39 -0.06 0.32 2.58 -5.45
Philippines 0.72 6.77 -2.59 1.15 6.97 0.93 1.00 9.20 0.01
Singapore 0.73 32.64 -12.25 0.69 24.93 -11.19 0.37 4.23 -7.23
Thailand 0.70 29.55 -12.55 0.55 32.89 -26.88 0.95 18.83 -1.01
Morocco 1.03 12.20 0.37 1.26 20.39 4.24 0.79 12.03 -3.20
China 0.80 40.23 -10.03 0.77 11.43 -3.34 0.82 96.92 -20.75
Panel 0.86 112.92 -17.81 0.88 119.56 -13.84 0.73 108.55 -26.56
Source: PWT and WEO.
We select our countries based on the sample coverage and data justification. Specifically, we select the OECD countries and the emerging market 
countries which are a total of 51 countries. Then we take out the East European transitional economies Czech. Rep. Hungary, Poland and Slovak Rep. 






Table A3b. Cointegration coefficient estimates
1950-2008 Before 1990 After 1990
Country Coefficient t-statistic (b=0) t-statistic (b=1) Coefficient t-statistic (b=0) t-statistic (b=1) Coefficient t-statistic (b=0) t-statistic (b=1)
Austria 1.20 53.97 9.17 1.20 59.75 9.98 1.11 25.24 2.44
Belgium 0.88 16.82 -2.19 0.90 18.00 -2.05 0.85 20.98 -3.71
Luxembourg 0.49 3.29 -3.46 0.33 0.98 -2.02 -0.04 -0.20 -5.88
Sweden 1.39 11.85 3.31 1.12 8.70 0.95 1.41 19.96 5.77
Switzerland 0.88 24.48 -3.24 0.78 14.55 -4.02 0.76 63.06 -19.87
Canada 1.01 12.29 0.16 0.85 10.19 -1.78 0.59 5.26 -3.73
Japan 0.95 57.09 -2.89 0.95 72.85 -4.06 0.78 35.13 -9.99
Ireland 0.48 13.11 -14.04 0.41 3.72 -5.47 0.56 26.38 -20.47
Spain 0.93 35.88 -2.86 0.94 43.87 -2.98 0.49 3.49 -3.61
Australia 0.83 10.86 -2.29 0.94 14.02 -0.82 0.42 3.53 -4.95
New Zealand 0.96 15.66 -0.65 1.08 14.26 1.07 -0.25 -1.84 -9.08
South Africa 0.75 13.46 -4.46 0.90 9.31 -0.99 0.55 3.30 -2.65
Argentina 0.90 39.29 -4.58 0.92 31.57 -2.70 1.02 24.85 0.57
Chile 0.80 5.04 -1.26 0.72 5.59 -2.18 1.31 36.29 8.58
Hong Kong 1.10 55.80 4.85 1.07 48.47 3.29 1.24 13.24 2.59
Korea 0.82 83.44 -17.81 0.78 49.24 -14.01 0.86 25.41 -3.99
Malaysia 0.67 18.43 -8.98 0.60 10.19 -6.93 0.75 6.96 -2.35
Pakistan 0.76 4.85 -1.52 0.99 6.39 -0.06 0.32 2.58 -5.45
Singapore 0.73 32.64 -12.25 0.69 24.93 -11.19 0.37 4.23 -7.23
Thailand 0.70 29.55 -12.55 0.55 32.89 -26.88 0.95 18.83 -1.01
China 0.80 40.23 -10.03 0.77 11.43 -3.34 0.82 96.92 -20.75
Panel 0.86 126.14 -19.11 0.83 107.12 -16.63 0.71 94.62 -22.87
Source: PWT and WEO.
We select our countries based on the sample coverage and data justification. Specifically, we select the OECD countries and the emerging market 
countries which are a total of 51 countries. Then we take out the East European transitional economies Czech. Rep. Hungary, Poland and Slovak Rep. 
This leaves us with 47 countries in our data sample (25 OECD and 22 emerging markets). we selected countries has data coverage at least from year 1967.
Appendix A: Permanent and Transitory Shocks
This appendix illustrates the dierence between shocks that have permanent and
transitory eects.




for all s ≥ t. Since 0 ≤ ρ < 1, this says that the eects of a shock in the AR(1)
process die out over time and the long-run eect is zero.
However, for process (11), the predicated value of Ps for all s ≥ t, conditional
on information in period t, is
Et(Ps) = Pt
This says that the eect of a shock in a pure random walk process is permanent.




E(Tt+s − Tt+s|t)2 = 1/(1− ρ)σ2ζ
While the variance of the forecast error for process (11) tends to innity, since
E(Pt+s − Pt+s|t)2 = sσ2θ
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Appendix B: Deriving Equations
B.1 Deriving Equation (28)




Et(Yt+1) = Yt + (%εt + %
2εt−1 + %
3εt−2 + · · · )
Et(Yt+2) = Yt + (%εt + %
2εt−1 + %
3εt−2 + · · · ) + (%2εt + %3εt−1 + %4εt−2 + · · · )
= Yt + (%+ %
2)εt + (%
2 + %3)εt−1 + (%
3 + %4)εt−2 + · · ·
Et(Yt+3) = Yt + (%+ %
2 + %3)εt + (%
2 + %3 + %4)εt−1 + (%
3 + %4 + %5)εt−2 + · · ·
Plug these into equation (17)
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Now, let's de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Plug s into consumption function =⇒















εt−2 + · · · )]
= rBt + Yt +
r
(1 + r − %)r
[%εt + %
2εt−1 + %
3εt−2 + · · · )
= rBt + Yt +
r%




= rBt + Yt +
%
1 + r − %
(Yt − Yt−1)
B.2 Deriving Equation (29)
This equation is much easier to derive. Substitute Et(Yt)−Et−1(Yt) = εt, Et(Yt+1)−
Et−1(Yt+1) = (1+%)εt, Et(Yt+2)−Et−1(Yt+2) = (1+%+%2)εt, Et(Yt+3)−Et−1(Yt+3) =
(1−%s−t)/(1−%)εt, and limj→∞Et(Yt+j)−Et−1(Yt+j) = 1/(1−%)εt into equation
(19),







1 + %+ %2
(1 + r)2
εt + · · · )
Plug s = (1+r)
2
(1+r−%)r into equation above =⇒
Ct − Ct−1 =
1 + r




Appendix C: Probability Limits of ˆβLR and ˆβSR
In this appendix, we illustrate the limiting properties of ˆβLR and ˆβSR when the
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{ε2 · [W (r)]2 − γ0} j = 0
1
2
{ε2 · [W (r)]2 − γ0}+ γ0 + γ1 + · · ·+ γj−1 j = 1, 2, 3, · · ·





ε , ut = Yt−Yt−1 =
∞∑
j=0





















−→y means xT converges to y in distribution; xT
P
−→y means xT con-
verges to y in probability.
=⇒










































































plimT→∞ ˆβLR = λ+ r{−
λ%
1 + r − %
}
= λ(1− r%
1 + r − %
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where the second equality holds since Yt − Yt−1 = ut and Yt − Yt−1 = %(Yt−1 −
Yt−2) + εt.

























where γ0 ≡ E(u2t ) = σ2ε
∑∞
j=0 %


















λ(1 + r)(1− %2)
(1 + r − %)
So, ˆβSR is inconsistent even asymptotically since it consists of the true βSR times
a bias term 1− %2.
Appendix D: Studies using Conventional Panel
Analysis
We list the following studies, but the list is far from exclusive.
Kose et al. 2007
∆cit −∆cwt = αi + δt + (β0 + β1foit)(∆yit −∆ywt ) + εit
Sorensen et al 2007
∆cit −∆cwt = αi + (β0 + β1(EHBit − EHBwt ) + β2(t− t)(∆yit −∆ywt ) + εit
Bai and Zhang 2005
∆ct = αi + γ∆yt + εit
∆cit = αi + η∆c
w
t + γ∆yit + εit
Moser et al 2004
∆cit = αi + ηi∆c
w




t + (1− ηi)∆ypit + εit
Lewis 1996









∆ct = α + η∆c
w
t + γ(∆yt −∆it −∆gt) + εit
Appendix E: Technical Illustration on
Conventional and Nonstationary Panel
In Chapter 2 of this dissertation, we have illustrated that ˆβSR , the OLS estimate
on the slope coecient of equation (39), cannot consistently capture the true risk
sharing eect. However, ˆβLR , the OLS estimate on the slope coecient of equation
(37), can consistently capture the true long-run risk sharing eect. To make this
Chapter self-contained, we summarize the main results in Chapter 2 and extend
them to the context of equation (41) and (42).
Short-run and long-run risk sharing relationships
In a rudimentary model of a world of N countries with stochastic endowment out-
puts of one single tradable good, rational people maximize the discounted expected
value of lifetime utility under budget constraints.
For country i, we assume output is I(1) in the sense that
Yt − Yt−1 = ut (45)
where the process {ut} satises
ut = %ut−1 + εt (46)
where {εt} is a sequence of i.i.d. random variables with Eεt = 0, Eε2t = σ2ε , and
Eε4t <∞; 0 ≤ % < 1.
We assume there are no aggregate shocks to outputs. We also assume output is
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perishable so that the only way to share output risks is through nancial markets.
Financial markets are incomplete in the sense that only the 1−λ portion of output
risks can be shared in an insurance market.
Dene CSRt and Y
SR
t , the short-run changes of consumption and output under
the impact of a output shock, as CSRt ≡ ∂Ct∂εt εt and Y
SR
t ≡ ∂Yt∂εt εt respectively.









εt respectively, where superscripts SR and LR stand for short run and
long run.
Assuming a quadratic utility function and using the results from utility maxi-
mizations under a bond market and an insurance market, we can derive the dened
short-run and long-run risk sharing relationships,
CSRt =
λ(1 + r)




1 + r − %
)Y LRt (48)
Testing equations and testing results
Empirically, it is interesting to estimate the short-run and long-run relationships.
In the process of solving utility maximization under a bond market and an
insurance market, we yield the following consumption and bond holding processes,
Ct = (1− λ)C̄ + rBt + λ[Yt +
%
(1 + r − %)
(Yt − Yt−1)] (49)
Ct − Ct−1 =
λ(1 + r)
1 + r − %
εt (50)
93
Bt = B0 −
λ%
1 + r − %
(Yt−1 − Y−1) (51)
where Bt is bond holding at the beginning of period t; C̄ is the constant level of
consumption achieved in an insurance market. We use them to derive equations
(41) and (42).
1. Deriving equation (41) Plug equation (45)-(46) into equation (50),
Ct − Ct−1 =
λ(1 + r)




1 + r − %
(Yt − Yt−1)−
λ(1 + r)




1 + r − %
(Yt − Yt−1)−
λ(1 + r)





where the last equality holds because we substitute 4Yt−1 using Yt+1 = Yt +
t+1∑
s=−∞
%t+1−sεs (it is equation (45)-(46) expressed in another form).
We can rewrite Ct − Ct−1 into
Ct − Ct−1 = βSR(Yt − Yt−1) + µt (52)
where βSR = λ(1+r)




ψt−1−sεs where ψ is some function of %, λ and r; and Ct − Ct−1 v
I(0); Yt − Yt−1 v I(0).
We know that the OLS estimator of βSR, ˆβSR is not a consistent estimate of βSR
when the properties of equation (52) are as dened above.
So far, we derived equation (52) under the assumptions of a quadratic utility
function and no aggregate shocks. If the utility function is in the form of constant
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relative risk aversion, equation (52) will hold in log terms (Hall (1978)) since
consumption can only be approximated as a random walk process. If aggregate
shocks exist, we need to subtract them since aggregate shocks cannot be shared. So,
in a general specication, the testing equation will be 4ct−4cwt = α+βSR(4yt−
4ywt ) + µt, where lower case letters c and y denote log consumption and output.
cw and yw are the world average log consumption and output. Equation (41) is a
natural extension of the last equation in a panel context.
2. Deriving equation (42)
By plugging equation (51) into equation (49), we have













(1− λ)C̄ + rB0 + r
λ%




1 + r − %
Yt−1 + λ(Yt +
%
1 + r − %
∆Yt)
= α− r λ%




%t−sεs) + λ(Yt +
%




where the last equality holds because we let the constant term (1−λ)C̄+ rB0 +
r λ%





Ct = α + λ(1−
r%
1 + r − %
)Yt +
(1 + r)λ%




This is a testable equation that can be written into the following fashion:
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Ct = α + β
LRYt + ut (53)
where βLR = λ(1 − r%
1+r−%); ut has properties of a causal and invertible ARMA
process with ut =
t∑
s=−∞
ϕt−sεs where ϕ is a function of %, λ and r; and Ct v I(1);
Yt v I(1).
We know that the OLS estimator of βLR, ˆβLR, is a super-consistent estimate of
βLR when equation (53) satises the properties above.
Similarly, in a general specication, the long-run testing equation shall be ct −
cwt = α+β
LR(yt−ywt )+ut. Equation (42) is a natural extension of the last equation
in a panel context.
Appendix F: Group-mean FMOLS Estimator:
Model Specications and Estimation Recipes
To simplify the notations used in this appendix, we use y1it to denote cit − cwt and
y2it to denote yit − ywt . Equation (42) can be rewritten as
y1it = αi + βiy2it + εit t = 1, ..., T ; i = 1, ..., N (54)
where βi is the slope parameter in which we are interested as dened in the main
text; {εit} is an I(0) stationary weakly dependent disturbance term; and y2it is
I(1). Notice that if y2it is I(1) and εit is I(0), y1it is I(1) by construction.
Equation (54) is our regression model. We assume that the true model can be
expressed in the following equation system using the triangular representation:48
48The structure system below is typical of more general models which can have multiple re-
gressors, multidimensional cointegrationships and with deterministic trends in equation (56)
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y1it = αi + βiy2it + εit (55)
y2it = y2it−1 + υit t = 1, ..., T ; i = 1, ..., N (56)
where µit = (εit, υit)
′
are the I(0) stationary weakly dependent disturbance terms.
Since the properties of cointegration tests, cointegrating coecients estimates,
and hypothesis tests in the time series context have been well established, we
review some of the propositions in the time series context rst. The time series
counterparts of equations (55) and (56) are as follows:
y1t = α + βy2t + εt (57)
y2t = y2t−1 + υt t = 1, ..., T (58)
We assume that equations (57) and (58) satisfy the assumptions and therefore
the results in Proposition 19.2 of Hamilton (1994), which I quote below (note the
notation in the proposition is self-contained and should not be confused with the
notation outside the proposition):
Proposition 19.2: Let y1t be a scalar and y2t be a (g × 1) vector. Let n = g + 1,
and suppose that the (n × 1) vector (y1t, y′2t)′ is characterized by exactly one
cointegrating relation (h = 1) that has a nonzero coecient on y2t. Let that
triangular representation for the system be




(Phillips, 1991). Nevertheless, the discussion remains essentially the same.
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 = Ψ∗(L)εt ([19.2.11])
where εt is an (n×1) i.i.d. vector with mean zero, nite fourth moments, and posi-
tive variance-covariance matrix E(εtε
′
t) = PP
′. Suppose further that the sequence
of (n× n) matrices {s ·Ψ∗s}
∞
s=0 is absolutely summable and that the rows of Ψ
∗(1)



















indicates summation over t from 1 to T. Partition Ψ∗(1) · P as









 T 1/2(α̂T − α)
T (γ̂T − γ)
 L−→
 1 {´ [W (r)′dr} · Λ∗′2
Λ∗2 · {
´
[W (r)dr} Λ∗2 · {
´






where W (r) is n-dimensional standard Brownian motion, the integral sign denote

























. To better under-
stand this OLS estimator, let's consider a simplied case. If we assume y2t is a






are Gaussian disturbance processes,
the regression model [19.2.9] satises the case where the error term is i.i.d. Gaus-
sian and is independent of explanatory variables. Under these assumptions, the
OLS estimator is normal distributed and the t and F statistics have the exact t
and F distributions for inference. If the error term is non-Gaussian, OLS estimator








is autocorrelated and/or z∗t correlated with 4y2t. The
estimated γ̂T by OLS in [19.2.9] is still superconsistent, but now it has a second-
order bias. Actually, although 4y2t is mean zero in Proposition 19.2, the super-
consistency property survives even in the case E(4y2t) = δ2 6= 0. Hansen (1992)
has given the generalized result through rotating of variables. This generalization
is also applied to the case of FMOLS that we will discuss below. However, the
second-order bias, which does not go away asymptotically, may hinder our ability
to infer our testing results in nite samples, so the remaining task is how to correct
the second order bias created by the serial correlations and endogeneity caused by
feedback eects between 4y2t and z∗t .
Given there are dierent representations on the equation (57) and (58), it is not
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surprising on lack of consensus on the best empirical estimation approach. Phillips
and Loretan (1991) has shown the many dierent representations and the transfor-
mations and interchanges among them in the time series context. The asymptotic
theory of their paper concluded that the full systems maximum likelihood method
(FSML) in the situation where the unit roots are imposed is the optimal approach.
Meanwhile, they have also shown that the FMOLS developed by Phillips and
Hansen (1990) is optimal as well since FMOLS estimator are asymptotically the
same as FSML estimator. Given the limitation of spaces and also for the reason
that we will give the recipe for panel FMOLS estimator, please refer to Chapter
19.3 (Hamilton 1994) for the exact formula on the asymptotic distribution of the
FMOLS estimator and associated test statistics. But we can intuitively know that,
after corrections, the FMOLS estimator becomes well behaved and we can use the
standard asymptotic t and F statistics for inference.
Empirically, in the time series context, the inference based on FMOLS estimator
suers from the low power and high size distortion in nite samples. Pedroni
(2000) extended Phillips and Hansen (1990) FMOLS approach into panel and
developed panel group mean FMOLS estimator of (54).49
In the context of double indexed process where both N and T → ∞, three
approaches (sequential limit, diagonal limit and joint limit) are possible, depending
on the passage to innity of the two indexes. Phillips and Moon (2000) has
given a generalization on when the sequential limit is equivalent to joint limit.
49As stated in Baltagi and Kao (2000), the focus of panel data econometrics has shifted towards
studying the asymptotics of macro panels with large N (number of countries) and large T
(length of the time series) rather than the usual asymptotics of micro panel with large N and
small T...(t)he hope of the econometrics of non-stationary panel data is to combine the best
of both worlds: the method of dealing with non-stationary data from the time-series and the
increased data and power from the cross-section. The addition of the cross-section dimension,
under certain assumptions, can act as repeated draws from the same distribution. Thus as the
time and cross-section dimension increase panel test statistics and estimators can be derived
with converge in distribution to normally distributed random variables.
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Specically, they rst derived the sequential limit of a double index sequence and
then veried the joint limit theory applies when T,N → ∞ and T/N → ∞.
For the macroeconomic series, in most of the cases, we can think them as T is
potentially growing while N is relatively constant, so they t into the scenario
where T,N → ∞ and T/N → ∞. For this reason, the sequential limit theory
is used to develop the asymptotics for the panel group mean FMOLS estimators.
This is also consistent with the claim in Baltagi and Kao (2000) that cross section
can act as repeated draws from the same distribution. Therefore, we can think
the group mean FMOLS estimator below as T → ∞ being in a sense the true
asymptotic feature.
Let's look at the recipe on how to compute the group mean FMOLS estima-
tor and hypothesis test statistics. You will see why the short term dynamics in
a cointegrating system can be allowed to be heterogeneous across countries and
the regressors can be allowed for complete endogeneity. This is basically in keep
with the discussion of Phillips (1991) on why optimal estimation on cointegrating
coecients can be achieved without a nely detailed specication on the short-run
dynamics and how the endogeneity bias of the OLS estimation of the time series
counterpart of equation (54) can be adjusted. These arguments can be directly
applied into panel context.50
Step 1: Estimate by OLS the time series cointegration regression for each country
and collect estimated residuals ε̂it.
Step 2: For each country i, using estimated residuals from step 1, form the time
series vectors ξit = (ε̂it,∆y2it)
′. We can then use these vectors to compute the
country specic long-run covariance matrix Ωi =
∑∞
j=−∞Ψij, where Ψij is the jth
autocovariance for ξi. The matrix Ωi can be thought of as Ωi = Σi + Γi + Γ
′
i,
50The illustration below on computing step is based on a seminar at the IMF by Peter Pedroni.
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where Σi is contemporaneous covariance matrix; Γi and Γ
′
i are the forward and
backward spectrum respectively. We can use the Newey-West estimator to estimate
Ωi nonparametrically and get Ω̂i = Σ̂i + Γ̂i + Γ̂
′











it−s. The bandwidth Ki is typically chosen
as a fraction of the sample, such as Ki = 4(Ti/100)
2/9 (Newey and West (1994).
Step 3: For each country i, compute the adjustment terms γ̂i = Γ̂21i + Σ̂21i −
Ω̂21i/Ω̂22i(Γ̂22i + Σ̂22i) to correct for country specic serial correlation dynamics;
compute y∗1it = (y1it − y1i) − Ω̂21i/Ω̂22i 4 y2it to correct for country specic endo-
geneity where the dierence in y2it are used as "internal instruments". The terms
in γ̂i and y
∗
1it are indirectly from the estimates of the long-run covariance matrix






2 is scalar long-run variance of εit; Ω12i = Ω21i is the scalar long-run
covariance between εit and 4y2it;51 Ω22i is the scalar long-run covariance among
4y2it.
Step 4: Compute the country specic FMOLS estimator using the adjustment







(y2it − y2i)y∗1it − T γ̂i]
and the associated t-statistic is:
tβ̂∗FMi




51In the general case when y2it is not a scalar, but a M × 1 vector, then Ω12i = Ω
′
21i is M × 1
vector of long-run covariance between ε̂it and 4y2it,The analysis remain essentially the same.
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where βoi is the value of the coecient being tested under the null hypothesis.

















is the group mean.
Step 6: Compare panel statistic from step 5 to critical values of tails of N(0, 1)
distribution to reject. Specically, under H0 : βi = β0 (for all i, or, for most i)
tβ̂∗GFM
=⇒ N(0, 1)
Under HA : βi 6= β0 (for all i, or, for some i)
tβ̂∗GFM
→ ±∞
So this is a two-sided test and large absolute values imply rejection of null.
Steps 1 to 6 above provide the recipes for calculating the panel group mean
FMOLS estimator and test statistics on it. Please refer to Pedroni (2000) for the
theorems of consistency and limiting distribution of the panel group mean FMOLS
estimator. Please note that in this appendix, we only work on the FMOLS since
the DOLS is just the parametric counterpart of the FMOLS and therefore the
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